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ABSTRACT 
Seafood substitution, the intentional or negligent mislabeling of fish and seafood, is 
estimated to cost American consumers over $25 billion per year. According to some studies, 
more than a third of the five billion pounds of seafood consumed in the United States is 
mislabeled when sold. Despite being virtually omnipresent throughout every level the US food 
supply chain, seafood substitution is rarely prosecuted due to a woeful mismatch between the 
scale of the problem and the resources dedicated to enforcement.  This comment explores the 
pervasiveness of the fish fraud problem and the inadequacies of the current response before 
developing a “crowd-sourced” enforcement model to realign the economics of the seafood 
industry in order to reduce or eliminate consumer-facing seafood substation.  
 
 
KEY TERMS 
Seafood Substitution, Fish Fraud, Seafood Mislabeling, Food Inspection, Seafood Regulation, 
Consumer-Facing Fraud, Qui Tam Scheme, Economic Deterrence.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Each year, nearly five billion pounds of seafood is consumed within the United States, 
equating to roughly fifteen pounds per capita, generating trillions in revenue across the supply 
chain and impacting the livelihood of fisherman, importers, wholesalers, retailers, processors and 
restaurants.1  Lurking beneath the ocean’s remarkable bounty is a potentially costly and 
dangerous truth – more than a third of seafood and seafood products sold may be mislabeled, 
either through innocent confusion or blatant fraud.2  This mislabeling, commonly called seafood 
substitution, takes many forms – during importation when Asian catfish (swai) is labeled as 
grouper to avoid anti-dumping tariffs, at the wholesaler where frozen Pacific cod is sold as 
freshly caught local Atlantic cod to meet local demand, in the grocery store where farmed 
Atlantic salmon is labeled as higher-value wild-caught Coho, or on a sushi menu where the 
gastrointestinal distress inducing escolar is rechristened as “white tuna.”3  Seafood substitution is 
estimated to cost the American consumer over twenty-five billion dollars each year.4  
Despite being virtually omnipresent throughout every level the US food supply chain, 
seafood substitution is rarely prosecuted due to a woeful mismatch between the scale of the 
problem and the resources dedicated to enforcement.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (“NOAA”), which has the primary responsibility of enforcing the seafood 
                                                 
1 Nearly Half of U.S. Seafood Wasted, THE MARITIME EXECUTIVE (Jan. 1, 2017), http://maritime-
executive.com/article/nearly-half-of-us-seafood-wasted; Basic Questions about Aquaculture, 
NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aquaculture/faqs/faq_aq_101.html#4howmuch  
(last visited Jan. 1, 2017). 
2Kimberly Warner, Walker Timme, Beth Lowell & Michael Hirshfield, Oceana Study Reveals 
Seafood Fraud Nationwide, OCEANA.ORG at 1, 10, 61, 63 (2013), 
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/reports/National_Seafood_Fraud_Testing_Results_FINAL.pd
f [hereinafter OCEANA Study 2013] (21 states had mislabeled seafood using 1,215 samples 
from a variety of retail establishments. There was a wide variation of seafood mislabeling among 
the cities tested: 21% in Portland, 35% in Kansas City, 39% in New York, 18% in Boston, 26% 
in Washington DC, 38% in South Florida, 36% in Denver, 25% in Atlanta, 56% in Pittsburgh, 
32% in Chicago, 49% in Austin/Houston, 38% in Northern California, 18% in Seattle, 52% in 
Southern California and 33% nationwide.). 
3 Nicole Lou, Bait and Switch: The Fraud Crisis In the Seafood Industry, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 
19, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/bait-and-switch/388126/ 
[hereinafter Lou, Bait and Switch]; Nicole Danna, That “Grouper” is Really Mackerel: Seafood 
Fraud Rampant in Florida, NEW TIMES BROWARD PALM BEACH, July 24, 2012, 
http://www.browardpalmbeach.com/restaurants/that-grouper-is-really-mackerel-seafood-fraud-
rampant-in-florida-6389152; Jenn Abelson & Beth Daley, On the Menu, but not on your Plate, 
THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 23, 2011, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/2011/10/22/dnatest/NDbXGXdPR6O37mXRSVPGlL/story.html 
[hereinafter Abelson & Daley, On the Menu]; Beth Daley & Jenn Abelson, Fish Supply Chain 
Open to Abuses, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 24, 2011, 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/2011/10/23/suppliers-
art/ASVzh9iDn1rTNuMbS2beFO/story.html [hereinafter Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain 
Open to Abuse]. 
4 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3. 
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mislabeling provisions of the Lacey Act5 has less than one hundred fisheries investigators on 
staff.6  Meanwhile, the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”), which holds enforcement 
authority under the Food & Drug Act, inspects less than two-percent of imported seafood and 
fails to address economic fraud in any meaningful way.7  With such limited resources available, 
Federal enforcement tends to focus on only the largest scale of fish fraud, targeting multi-million 
dollar import and origin labeling frauds, particularly those where foreign caught seafood is 
relabeled as US caught or promoted as being from a distinctive US fishery.8  
While possibly justifiable given the lack of resources, these enforcement priorities fail to 
address the vast majority of seafood substitutions, especially at the retail and food service levels, 
leaving consumers across the country exposed to fraudulent fish.9  However, in response to 
growing awareness among consumers and industry watchdog groups, the Presidential Task Force 
on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing and Seafood Fraud released a 
number of broad recommendations aimed at combating seafood substitution through enhanced 
cooperation and information sharing between enforcement agencies, expanded regulation of 
seafood marketing by providing clear guidance on acceptable names and labels for marketing,10 
                                                 
5 16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) (2016) (“It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false record, 
account, or label for, or any false identification of any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or 
is intended to be (1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received from any 
foreign country; or (2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”); see also, Fraud, 
FISHWATCH U.S. SEAFOOD FACTS, http://www.fishwatch.gov/eating-seafood/fraud (last visited 
Jan. 1, 2017) [hereinafter Fraud, FISHWATCH U.S. SEAFOOD FACTS]. 
6 Catherine Rentz, Seafood Fraud Cases Plummet as NOAA Cuts Investigators, THE PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Dec. 11, 2014, http://www.pressherald.com/2014/12/11/seafood-fraud-cases-
plummet-as-noaa-cuts-investigators/.  
7 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO 
THE RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OCEANS, ATMOSPHERE, FISHERIES, AND COAST 
GUARD, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE: SEAFOOD 
FRAUD, 5-6 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/290/287425.pdf [hereinafter GAO SEAFOOD 
FRAUD]. 
8 E.g., Peter Dujardin & Tamara Dietrich, Feds Investigating Casey’s Seafood on Mixing Atlantic 
Blue Crab with Imports, DAILY PRESS (June 25, 2015),  
http://www.dailypress.com/news/crime/dp-nws-federal-charges-peninsula-20150627-story.html; 
Office of Public Affairs, North Carolina Seafood Processor and Distributor Sentenced for 
Mislabeling Shrimp, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Aug. 11, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/north-carolina-seafood-processor-and-distributor-sentenced-
mislabeling-shrimp; Texas Company Sentenced for Passing Off Mexican Shrimp As U.S. Caught, 
NOAA FISHERIES (Sep. 24, 2015), 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ole/newsroom/stories/15/24_texas_company_sentenced_for_passing_
_off_mexican_shrimp_as_u.s.-caught.html. 
9 OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2, at 1-2. 
10 See generally The Seafood List - FDA's Guide to Acceptable Market Names for Seafood Sold 
in Interstate Commerce, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocumentsRegulatoryInformation/Seaf
ood/ucm113260.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2017) [hereinafter FDA Seafood List]  (“This guidance 
is intended to provide guidance to industry about what FDA considers to be acceptable market 
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and plans to establish a comprehensive international origin and processing traceability 
program.11  Unfortunately, in the current US political climate, proposals that require legislative 
approval for additional resources or regulatory controls are, at best, unlikely to proceed.  
Faced with a permanent and terminal disconnect between the resources allocated to 
enforcement and the scale of the seafood substitution problem there is an opportunity to augment 
traditional command and control regulation with creative solutions that leverage potential 
liability to induce change.  This comment will propose the construction of a post-regulatory 
enforcement regime targeting consumer-facing seafood fraud, primarily built from tested legal 
innovations used in other areas of the law, such as civil rights litigation, strict liability statutes, 
and tax enforcement.  The goal is to create a statutory mechanism that: (1) crowd sources 
inspection to the local consumer or consumer group; (2) organizes cases into an efficient scale 
for discovery and adjudication; (3) differentiates bad actors from the merely sloppy or easily 
bamboozled; and (4) imposes a severe enough penalty such that it aligns the economics of the 
industry in order to minimize mislabeling throughout the supply chain.   
 This comment will begin in Section II by analyzing the scope of the problem, the current 
state of the laws and the inadequacy of resources dedicated to addressing seafood substitution. 
The comment will then review the motivators of seafood substitution as well as recent 
enforcement actions by NOAA and the US Department of Justice.  Section III will clearly define 
the goals for any proposed statutory or regulatory changes and review the metrics for success 
before analyzing the applicability of legal innovations from other areas of law (strict liability, 
private enforcement, fee shifting, qui tam lawsuits, and insurance as quasi-regulator).  Section IV 
will restate the chosen elements of the proposed scheme, and section V will speculate as to 
regime’s impact on typical enforcement scenarios.  
 
II. THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM AND THE STATE OF THE LAW 
A. The Problem 
Seafood substitution is not a new phenomenon.  For example, the use of surimi, a fish 
paste that can imitate crab, lobster and other shellfish, dates back centuries in Japan and is used 
to this day, 12 sometimes transparently,13 at other times not.14  Over the past decade, however, 
                                                                                                                                                             
names for seafood sold in interstate commerce and to assist manufacturers in labeling seafood 
products. . . FDA’s guidance documents, including this guidance, do not establish legally 
enforceable responsibilities.  Instead, guidances describe the Agency's current thinking on a topic 
and should be viewed only as recommendations. . .”). 
11 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD, at 3-4 (March 
2015), http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/ia/iuu/noaa_taskforce_report_final.pdf. 
12 Seafood Q&A: What is Surimi?, SEAFOODHEALTHFACTS.ORG, 
http://www.seafoodhealthfacts.org/faq/what-surimi (last visited Jan. 9, 2017). 
13 See e.g., Simply Surimi, Flake Style, TRANSOCEAN PRODUCTS, http://trans-ocean.com/our-
products/simply-surimi/flake-style/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2017) (“This great-tasting seafood is 
certified gluten-free and certified sustainable by MSC and heart healthy by the American Heart 
Association.”). 
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concerted efforts by government agencies, the traditional press, and non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) have revealed that mislabeling is endemic across the U.S. seafood 
supply chain, exceeding thirty-percent in all seafood nationally, with higher rates of fraud in 
several major metropolitan areas.15  The National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) voluntary 
seafood inspection program also documents a forty-percent rate of mislabeling among submitted 
products.16  While direct extrapolation from these studies is slightly fraught,17 they yield an 
estimate that more than one and a half billion pounds of mislabeled seafood moves through the 
U.S. market annually.18  
Although this comment focuses on the economic impact of seafood substitution, and the 
estimated twenty-five billion dollars in economic cost to U.S. consumers and businesses,19 
rampant levels of seafood substitution impact other areas of policy.  Seafood mislabeling 
negatively affects environmental concerns by undercutting fisheries management through 
misreported statistics on fish consumption, which can lead to inaccurate estimates being used in 
setting catch limits.20  Similarly, mislabeling can confuse consumers into thinking endangered 
fisheries are healthy and abundant, discouraging them from adjusting their purchasing habits 
towards more sustainable sources.21   
Widespread seafood mislabeling also implicates food safety.  For example, tilefish is 
often substituted for grouper, but has a much higher level of mercury accumulation.22  Inaccurate 
labeling could easily result in overconsumption of mercury among pregnant woman or other 
populations subject to enhanced risk.  Moreover, marketing escolar as “white tuna” or 
“butterfish” exposes diners to explosive gastrointestinal distress from indigestible gempylotoxin 
                                                                                                                                                             
14 See e.g., Felicity Lawrence, Diner is left shellshocked over crab dish, THE GUARDIAN, May 2, 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/02/diner-shellshocked-crab-dish-frankie-
bennys-surimi.  
15 OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2 (39% in New York, 38% in South Florida, 36% in 
Denver, 56% in Pittsburgh, 32% in Chicago, 49% in Austin/Houston, 38% in Northern 
California, 52% in Southern California and 33% nationwide); Stephen Wagner, Note, When 
Tuna Still Isn't Always Tuna: Federal Food Safety Regulatory Regime Continues to Inadequately 
Address Seafood Fraud, 20 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 111, 113-15 (2015). 
16 Gill Paterson, et al, Seafood Fraud in the United States: Current Science and Policy Options, 
UNIV. OF MINNESOTA FOOD POLICY RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.foodpolicy.umn.edu/policy-summaries-and-analyses/seafood-fraud-united-states-
current-science-and-policy-options; see generally GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7. 
17 The conglomeration of fraud data and its extension to the overall supply of seafood is not 
strictly a haddock to haddock comparison—most of the NGO and press reports focus on retail or 
restaurant level sales while government enforcement efforts are generally focused on importers, 
distributors and wholesalers. Extrapolation across categories may underestimate the actual 
incidence of seafood mislabeling in any given species or product type.  
18 See also Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2; Paterson, 
supra note 16.  
19 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3. 
20 Wagner, supra note 15, at 117. 
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
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(wax esters) in the meat of the fish.23  Extensive use of antibiotics and chemical additives in 
aquaculture becomes a more dangerous proposition when consumers cannot distinguish wild 
caught seafood (such as salmon or shrimp) from similar farmed varieties at the restaurant or 
grocery store.24  This situation is even more concerning because many exporting countries 
provide minimal or no oversight of their aquaculture industry.25   
 
B. Enforcement Resources and the Current State of the Law 
Unfortunately the many studies of seafood substitution provide only minimal evidence 
regarding intention and responsibility.26  While researchers tend to blame foreign producers and 
importers for the bulk of seafood fraud, substitution has been documented at every level of the 
U.S. supply chain.27  Substitution, from negligent mislabeling to blatant fraud, is further enabled 
by an underfunded patchwork of regulatory and enforcement regimes at the federal and state 
levels.  Federally, seafood is regulated by NOAA, the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”), 
U.S. Customs & Border Protection (“CBP”), U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), and the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), but a lack of cross agency coordination is frequently cited 
as one of the barriers to effective prevention and enforcement.28  
 
1. Primary Federal Agencies Tasked with Enforcement 
Primary management of U.S. fisheries and ocean resources resides with the NOAA 
National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”) under the U.S. Department of Commerce.29  In 
addition to managing the coastal fisheries, NMFS and the NOAA Office of Law Enforcement 
(“OLE”) investigate noncompliance from seafood mislabeling to stolen lobster traps, and refer 
                                                 
23 Use Caution When Eating Escolar, THE KITCHN, http://www.thekitchn.com/use-caution-when-
eating-escola-66602 (last visited Oct. 24, 2015) (Escolar is banned in Japan and Italy, and 
requires a warning label in Canada, Sweden and Demark).  The author would like to note that 
escolar is delicious in taste and exceptional is texture, it is the consumption of more than a small 
portion that produces the gastrointestinal concerns.  The choice of whether or not to eat escolar, 
also called “ex-lax” fish, and risk an embarrassing and uncomfortable reaction, should be the 
right of a fully informed consumer. 
24 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3. 
25 Id. 
26 Abelson & Daley, On the Menu, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to 
Abuse, supra note 3; Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Danna, supra note 3; see generally 
OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2. 
27 Abelson & Daley, On the Menu, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to 
Abuse, supra note 3; Danna, supra note 3; GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7; Lou, Bait and 
Switch, supra note 3; OCEANA Study 2013, supra note 2. 
28 GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7, at 2-3; Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; 
PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD supra note 11, at 
24.  
29 Our Mission, NOAA FISHERIES, http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/aboutus/our_mission.html (last 
visited Jan 10, 2017).  
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seafood substitution cases to the Department of Justice for prosecution under the Lacey Act30 or 
the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act. 31  NOAA NMFS regulates 
all U.S. Coastal Fisheries from three miles out to two hundred miles offshore (or nine miles to 
two hundred miles off various parts of Texas), but has fewer than 100 agents for the entire 
country.32  Despite being responsible for the inspection and safety of billions of pounds of 
seafood, NMFS has cut the number of field investigators from 147 in 2008 to a mere ninety-three 
in 2014.33  Over the same time period, NOAA records reflect a precipitous seventy-five percent 
drop in prosecutions for seafood fraud, from 793 to 215.34  
Additionally, while the FDA is responsible for the overall safety of the U.S. food supply, 
it does not regulate most meat products, which are under the purview of the USDA 
(supplemented by equivalent state inspection programs), and takes a very limited role in 
combating seafood fraud.35  The FDA has 1,100 inspectors on staff and is responsible for 
167,000 processing facilities, which are inspected “routinely” in relation to the risks presented.36  
“Routinely” may mean once every ten years.37  Moreover, the FDA is estimated to inspect less 
than two-percent of imported seafood and has generally failed to bring a concerted effort to 
address economic fraud.38  However, that agency does maintain the Seafood List, which cross-
references official species names against vernacular and marketing names for seafood.  While the 
Seafood List does not carry any legal authority, it does provide guidance about what the FDA 
considers acceptable naming and marketing conventions.39  For example, a search for “snapper” 
yields 56 species of fish that the FDA considers marketable under the name “snapper,” including 
such fish as Grey Snapper, Crimson Jobfish, and Twinspot Snapper.40 
 
2. The Lacey Act & Other Federal Proposals (SAFE Seafood Act) 
                                                 
30 The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2016) (Conservation law passed in 1900 that creates 
civil and criminal penalties for interstate trading in prohibited plants and animals, as well as 
trading in any wildlife that has been illegally harvested in its origin jurisdiction.  Also provides 
criminal penalties for intentional mislabeling of wildlife and any derived products.).  
31 Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1884 
(2016) (Passed in 1976 the Magnuson-Stevens Act regulates US fisheries for long-term 
biological and economic sustainability.).  
32 Rentz, supra note 6. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7, at 2-3. 
36 FDA Basics: How often does FDA inspect food manufacturing facilities? U.S. FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194242.htm 
(last visited Oct 16, 2015).  
37 Nathan M. Trexler, Note, "Market" Regulation: Confronting Industrial Agriculture's Food 
Safety Failures, 17 WIDENER L. REV. 311, 323 (2011). 
38 GAO SEAFOOD FRAUD, supra note 7, at 2, 5, 13.  
39 FDA Seafood List, supra note 10.  
40 Id. (note that only one singular fish, Lutjanus campechanus, is marketable as “red snapper” 
according to the Seafood List). 
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The Lacey Act, originally passed in 1900, creates civil and criminal penalties for those 
trading in prohibited plants and wildlife and makes it a crime to sell or transport any animals or 
plants that have been illegally harvested under state, federal or foreign law.41  The original 
intention of the Act was to address poaching and the preservation of game animals by making it 
a federal crime to poach in one state and sell the catch across state lines. 42  This enhancement of 
existing state laws attempted to remove any viable interstate profit from the activity.  In addition 
to prohibiting the transport and sale of illegally harvested wildlife and plants, the Lacey Act also 
provides criminal penalties for mislabeling:  
 
It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false record, account, or label 
for, or any false identification of, any fish, wildlife, or plant which has been, or is 
intended to be (1) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received 
from any foreign country; or (2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce.43 
 
Further, depending on the value of the mislabeled fish at issue, the Act provides civil fines of up 
to $10,000, and criminal penalties include up to five years of imprisonment as well as fines of 
$350,000 for individuals and $500,000 for organizations.44  While a robust and flexible tool, the 
Lacey Act is used almost exclusively in enforcement against importers, wholesaler/distributors, 
and fishermen.  The Lacey Act does not, and cannot, address retail or restaurant labeling, and 
thus leaves enforcement of these primarily intra-state commerce issues to local authorities under 
applicable state fraud, mislabeling, and consumer protection statutes.  
In response to media and NGO investigations of seafood substitution,45 Rep. Edward 
Markey introduced the Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act (“SAFE Seafood Act”) in 
2012 and 2013.46  The SAFE Seafood Act would have imposed stricter labeling requirements 
(species, acceptable name, origin, harvest method, date of catch, weight, processing location, 
farmed status, fresh/frozen status), moved responsibility for maintaining the Seafood List from 
FDA to HHS, encouraged inter agency cooperation, affirmed FDA’s primacy on inspections and 
required the FDA to begin addressing economic fraud as part of its existing inspection scheme.47  
The SAFE Act would also have provided enforcement powers and penalties in line with the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act §§ 308 through 311.48  The 2013 
                                                 
41 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (2016). 
42 Rebecca F. Wisch Overview of the Lacey Act (16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378), MICHIGAN STATE 
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF LAW ANIMAL LEGAL & HISTORICAL CENTER, 
https://www.animallaw.info/article/overview-lacey-act-16-usc-ss-3371-3378 (last visited Jan 7, 
2017).  
43 16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) (2012).  
44 16 U.S.C. §§ 3373(a)(1), (d)(3) (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771(b)(3), (c)(3) (2012). 
45 See Rep. Markey Introduces SAFE Seafood Act to Combat Fish Fraud, FOOD SAFETY NEWS 
(Mar 8, 2013), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/03/rep-market-introduces-safe-seafood-
act-to-combat-fish-fraud/#.Vxf_QjArKM9. 
46 Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act, H.R. 6200, 112th Cong. (2012) (reintroduced 
on Mar. 6, 2013 as H.R. 1012); Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act, S. 520, 113th 
Cong. (2013). 
47 Id.  
48 Id. 
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version of the SAFE Seafood Act was referred to multiple committees within the House of 
Representatives, nevertheless, no further action was taken.49   
 
3. Presidential Task Force on IUU Fishing 
Created in 2014, the Presidential Task Force on Combating Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated (“IUU”) Fishing and Seafood Fraud brought together thirteen federal agencies50 to 
provide recommendations for the establishment of a “comprehensive framework of integrated 
programs to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud that emphasizes the greatest need.”51  The 
task force produced fifteen broad recommendations to combat IUU fishing and seafood fraud at 
the international level by strengthening enforcement tools, enhancing inter-agency and Federal-
State coordination and information sharing, and increasing traceability requirements.52  While all 
of the recommendations would have at least a collateral impact on reducing seafood substitution, 
six are particularly relevant to combating the consumer-facing economic fraud this comment is 
most concerned with: #8 expanding enforcement information sharing across key 
agencies/departments tasked with enforcement; #10 providing clearer industry guidance on 
acceptable marketing names and coordinating the FDA Seafood List with Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule (HTS) codes for imported seafood products to reduce confusion; #11 enhanced 
cooperation between federal agencies and State/Local enforcement using tools like NOAA’s 
Cooperation Enforcement Program, FDA state food safety inspection contracts, and increased 
fraud detection and prosecution training for state agencies; #12 expanding enforcement resources 
and law enforcement tools for with existing regulatory authority; #14 and # 15 develop and 
                                                 
49 159 CONG. REC. H1319 (daily ed. Mar. 6, 2013) (statement of Mr. Markey) (“A bill to 
strengthen Federal consumer protection and product traceability with respect to commercially 
marketed seafood, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in 
addition to the Committees on Agriculture, Natural Resources, and Ways and Means, for a 
period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.”); 159 CONG. REC. S1592 
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013) (statement of Mr. Begich) (“A bill to strengthen Federal consumer 
protection and product traceability with respect to commercially marketed seafood, and for other 
purposes; to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation.”). 
50 Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud members agencies 
(and sub agencies): Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce (including NOAA), 
Department of Defense (Navy), Department of Health and Human Services (including FDA), 
Department of the Interior (including U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), Department of Justice, 
Department of State (including the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and 
Scientific Affairs), Federal Trade Commission, U.S. Agency for International Development and 
the Executive Office of the President (including the Council on Environmental Quality, National 
Security Council, Office of Management and Budget, Office of Science and Technology Policy 
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative).  
51 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON COMBATING IUU FISHING AND SEAFOOD FRAUD supra note 11, 
at 3. 
52 Id. at 10-39. 
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establish an international traceability program to track seafood from harvest through its entry 
into the stream of U.S. commerce.53   
Indeed, the traceability program detailed in the task force’s report has been promulgated 
into a final rule creating the Seafood Traceability Program, which was published in December 
2016, and will take effect in 2018.54  The program requires the importer of record for certain 
species of seafood that are commonly mislabeled or harvested illegally55 to receive a permit from 
NMFS, as well as to electronically file species, harvest event, point of origin (harvest area or 
aquaculture facility), processing information, and landing data for each shipment prior to entry.56  
Importers under this program may be subject to field audits, and are therefore also required to 
retain both electronic and paper records pertaining to each shipment for two-years.57  
These heightened documentary requirements will certainly help with NOAA OLE’s 
existing enforcement priorities, but the Seafood Traceability Program remains an incomplete 
solution.  While the Program applies to some of the most frequently substituted species, its 
coverage is far from comprehensive and only includes imported fish products at the time of 
entry.  Thus, it provides no new protections for consumers of domestically harvested or 
processed seafood and continues.  Moreover, even with increased traceability, national 
enforcement is still left to fewer than a hundred agents.  
Additional administrative and legislative action will be required to actualize the 
remainder of the Task Force’s recommendations, but it remains unclear how the Trump 
administration will allocate resources to fight economic fraud in general, or seafood substitution 
in particular.  Given Congress’s inability to pass even routine funding bills in a timely manner, 
executive leadership on the issue is a must.  Unfortunately, barring some surge in personal 
interest from President Trump, or the Secretaries of Commerce or HHS, the Task Force’s 
comprehensive recommendations are likely to remain hostage to Washington’s legislative 
dysfunction and deregulatory zeal.  
 
4. State Laws and Proposals 
Reacting to public concern and increased press coverage of seafood fraud, the legislatures 
of New York and Massachusetts attempted to address seafood substitution at the retail level in 
2013 and 2014, only to have the proposed bills die quietly in committee.58  Virtually identical 
                                                 
53 See id. 
54 See generally Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act; Seafood Import 
Monitoring Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 88975-02 (Dec. 9, 2016) (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. Parts 
300 and 600.). 
55 Id. (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(a)(2)) (“Atlantic Cod; Pacific Cod; Blue Crab; Red 
King Crab; Dolphinfish (Mahi Mahi); Grouper; Red Snapper; Sea Cucumber; Sharks; Swordfish; 
Tunas (Albacore, Bigeye, Skipjack, Yellowfin, and Bluefin).”).  
56 Id. (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(b)(3)).  
57 Id. (to be codified as 50 C.F.R. § 300.324(d)). 
58 H.B. 1946, 188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013) (reported favorably by Joint Committee on Public 
Health, referred to Committee on Ways and Means July 22 2013); A.B. 9620, 237th Leg. Sess. 
(N.Y. 2014) (Introduced and referred to the Agriculture Committee on May 13, 2014). 
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bills were reintroduced in both states during the 2015 and 2016 sessions, where New York’s 
finally passed.59  Massachusetts’ third attempt remains parked in committee awaiting attention. 60  
New York’s law, which took effect in January 2017, is quite limited, but explicitly 
prohibits the marketing of escolar as “white tuna.”61  Under the law, restaurants, retailers, and 
wholesalers mislabeling the dreaded “ex-lax fish” would face a $600 fine for the first offense, 
with multiple offenses rising to $1,200 per day of violation, and is enforced by the New York 
Department of Agriculture and Markets.62  It is not yet clear if the newly implemented provision 
will yield any noticeable enforcement action or change in restaurant marketing practices.  
In Massachusetts, the most recent draft of the proposed bill bans the sale of escolar 
completely, fining purveyors $400 for a first offense, and $800 for further violations.63  The 
proposed legislation also provided penalties for mislabeling local favorites, specifically Atlantic 
Cod, Atlantic Halibut, Grey Sole, and Red Snapper, and the mislabeling of Pacific Cod which is 
frequently used as a substitute.64  Fines would start at $800 for the first offense and $1,600 for 
additional violations, along with the possible revocation of the fraudulent purveyor’s commercial 
licenses.65  Inspections would be handled by the Department of Public Health and the 
Department of Fish and Game.66   
Unlike states that have offered solutions targeted at seafood substitution, Florida has 
implemented a broad statute directly targeted at restaurant and retail mislabeling which has been 
applied to fish fraud. Florida Statute § 509.292 sets forth: 
 
An operator may not knowingly and willfully misrepresent the identity of any 
food or food product to any of the patrons of such establishment.  The identity of 
food or a food product is misrepresented if: 
(a) The description of the food or food product is false or misleading in any 
particular;  
(b) The food or food product is served, sold, or distributed under the name of 
another food or food product; or  
                                                 
59 A.B. 1231, 238th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015) (signed by governor on Sep. 9, 2016); H.B. 1939, 
189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015) (Joint Committee on Public Health reviewed as part of hearing on 
Sep. 17, 2015, report not yet available); H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016). 
60 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016) (referred to House Committee on Bills in the Third 
Reading).  
61 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-i(2) (2016) (“No person, wholesaler, distributor, retail food 
store or food service establishment shall willfully sell, offer for sale, distribute, import, or export 
the species of fish commonly known as escolar or oilfish under the name tuna, albacore tuna, 
white tuna, or any other species name, common or scientific, other than the recognized common 
or scientific species names for such species defined in subdivision one of this section.”); see also 
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 201-i(1)(c) (2016) (“‘white tuna’ shall mean the fish species 
known as albacore tuna, long fin tuna, or the scientific species name thunnus alalunga.”). 
62 N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 39 (2016).  
63 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016). 
64 Id.  
65 Id. 
66 Id.  
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(c) The food or food product purports to be or is represented as a food or food 
product that does not conform to a definition of identity and standard of quality if 
such definition of identity and standard of quality has been established by custom 
and usage.67 
 
§ 509.292 violations carry penalties of up to $800,68 and are proven by comparing invoices and 
inventory with the menu, rather than the potentially costly DNA testing used in most NGO 
studies.  Despite this, Florida has been comparatively aggressive in enforcement and between 
2006 and 2012, 1,400 citations were issued for violation of the food code by restaurants.69  
Unfortunately, the scale of the violations makes clear that the penalty is not strong enough to 
deter the profit motive behind the fraud.  
  
5. Relevant Maine Statutes 
Intentional seafood mislabeling by restaurants, retailers, or wholesalers would appear to 
meet the elements of Deceptive Business Practices, a class D crime in Maine: “(1) A person is 
guilty of deceptive business practices if, in the course of engaging in a business, occupation or 
profession, he intentionally: (D) Sells, offers or exposes for sale any commodity which is 
adulterated or mislabeled.”70  Further, Maine’s law on the labeling of shellfish states: 
 
A person who is authorized to hold or possess shellfish under chapter 623 may not 
label shellfish sold alive using the words “product of Maine” or any other similar 
words or terms that misleadingly suggest the shellfish was taken from the waters 
of this State unless the shellfish was in fact taken from the waters of the State. 
 
The sale of shellfish labeled in violation of this section is a deceptive business 
practice in violation of Title 17-A, section 901.71 
 
The seafood mislabeling provision was passed in 2011 specifically to address concerns that 
shellfish from out of state was being processed in Maine and then relabeled as a native product 
and sold to tourists.72  While the statute is only on point for a very specific type of seafood 
substitution, it is a simple extrapolation that other instances of intentional seafood mislabeling 
could fall under Deceptive Business Practices, with two major caveats.   
First, it provides authority only for the identification of shellfish by its place of origin (i.e. 
from Maine or not).73  No other type of seafood is addressed by the statute, so extending 
Deceptive Business Practices further may be more problematic than is obvious.  Recall that the 
                                                 
67 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.292(1)(a)-(c) (LexisNexis through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
68 See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082 and 775.083 (LexisNexis through 2016 Reg. Sess.). 
69 Danna, supra note 3. 
70 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 901 (2016). 
71 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 6005 (2016). 
72 SHELLFISH--BRANDS, MARKS AND LABELS, 2011 Me. Legis. Serv. Ch. 234 (H.P. 
1035) (L.D. 1409). 
73 ME. REV. STAT. tit. 12, § 6005. 
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FDA Seafood List does not have authority to create enforceable obligations,74 moreover, there is 
no comprehensive state equivalent in Maine.  While Maine could bolster enforcement, it may 
first require legislative action to create legal authority for seafood naming conventions.  One may 
think that if ever there was something Maine’s elected officials could agree on it would be 
protecting Maine’s brand and the livelihood of local fishermen by providing enforcement against 
fraud “from away.”   
Yet, despite this impulse, the shellfish labelling statute remains a symbolic law with 
minimal teeth and limited and unpublicized enforcement.75  Maine’s former colonial master, 
Massachusetts, which has a similar cultural history glorifying the nobility and economic vitality 
of fishing (particularly fishing for Atlantic Cod), serves as a similarly contrary example.  The 
Massachusetts Legislature is poised for its third consecutive failure to adopt anti-substitution 
laws to protect local specialties (Atlantic Cod, Atlantic Halibut, Grey Sole, and Red Snapper).76   
Second, given the minimal monetary damages from any individual instance of a 
consumer-facing seafood mislabeling, it is unlikely that Maine’s law enforcement community 
will prioritize the issue without further prompting.  What branch of law or code enforcement is 
responsible for detecting seafood substitution?  Is it law enforcement such as Maine State 
Troopers or local police departments?  It seems politically laughable to even consider asking 
such groups to prioritize economic fraud over more general public safety concerns.  Could 
enforcement be handled by municipal code officers or perhaps the Department of Health? Would 
it be feasible? Would it be appropriate to task health inspectors with anti-fraud enforcement? 
Even in Portland, Maine’s most populous city, and culinary hot spot,77 the approximately 800 
restaurants are subject to food service inspections less than once every six months on average.78  
Currently the inspection form contains a single relevant item under good retail practices, and 
food inspection, asking only if “Food properly labeled; original container.”79 
  
6. The Enforcement Gap 
Given that Federal agencies have limited enforcement resources to dedicate to 
prosecuting seafood substitution, a focus on the largest malefactors makes some degree of 
                                                 
74 FDA Seafood List, supra note 10. 
75 No examples of enforcement have been obtained despite a reasonably exhaustive search.  
76 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016); H.B. 1939, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2015); H.B. 1946, 
188th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2013). 
77 Patty Lee, The 10 Hottest Restaurants in Portland, Maine, ZAGATS, (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.zagat.com/b/the-10-hottest-restaurants-in-portland-maine; See also, Mathew 
Moragan, Take to the High Seas in Portland, Maine, THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (Aug. 
19, 2015), http://nymag.com/travel/weekend-escapes/portlandmaine2015/. 
78 Food Service Establishment Inspection Reports, PORTLAND MAINE, 
http://www.portlandmaine.gov/640/Food-Service-Establishment-Inspection-Re (last visited Nov 
28, 2015) (diner complaints will prompt additional inspections, inspection failure also generates 
a remedial follow-up inspection).   
79 See e.g. 3 Buoys Seafood Shanty & Grill, STATE OF MAINE HEALTH INSPECTION REPORT (Nov 
29, 2015), 
http://24.39.51.187/hhs/reports/3%20BUOYS%20SEAFOOD%20SHANTY%20&%20GRILL_
81915.pdf. 
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economic sense as an efficient use of those resources.  However, by only prosecuting multi-
million dollar examples of fraud, the government is leaving the vast majority of consumer facing 
fish frauds undetected and allowing most fraudsters to operate essentially without consequence.  
Individual retailers and restaurants face minimal fines in a few jurisdictions, but for most of the 
country the penalties for being caught in even the most egregious of fish frauds is a bit of public 
shaming by the local press that appears to be quickly forgotten.80  Given that state agency 
budgets are even more constrained than their federal counterparts, and the failure of most state 
legislatures to pass enforceable statutes to address the issue, it seems at best unrealistic to expect 
states to step into a traditional command and control method of regulating seafood sales.  To that 
end, a more unconventional approach is required.  
 
C. Insufficient Funds: Why Consumers Are Not Pursuing Claims for Fraudulent 
Misrepresentation 
 
Seafood substitution meets the common law definition of fraudulent misrepresentation, 
and actions could be brought by consumers against restaurants or retailers if they could make a 
prima facie case.  Under Maine law, for example, a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation for 
seafood substitution would require proof by clear and convincing evidence that: 
 
(1) that [the fish seller] made a false representation (2) of a 
material fact (3) with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless 
disregard of whether it is true or false (4) for the purpose of 
inducing [the consumer] to act in reliance upon it, and (5) [the 
consumer] justifiably relied upon the representation as true and 
acted upon it to [their] damage.81 
While it may be logistically difficult to acquire evidence of each element, for a proto-typical 
example of fish fraud, none of the elements are truly insurmountable.  Elements (1), (2), (3) and 
(4) could be satisfied by documentation that the seafood listed on the menu and that which was 
delivered to the customer were materially different types of seafood.  These elements could be 
proven through DNA sequencing of the diner’s meal, if possible, but more likely they could be 
inferred through a comparison of the diner’s receipt and the restaurant’s supplier invoices from 
the relevant time period.  The issue of damages (5) turns out to be the limiting factor, but not 
because they are unprovable.  
For the potential consumer plaintiff and their prospective lawyer the largest barrier to 
bringing an action for fraudulent misrepresentation in a case of seafood substitution turns out to 
be the very limited nature of the damages involved.  Simply put, it is hard to envision a situation 
involving any individual consumer subjected to intentional fish fraud where more than a few 
                                                 
80 Jenn Abelson & Beth Daley, Many Mass. Restaurants Still Serve Mislabeled Fish, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 2, 2012, 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/12/02/dnasidebar/SAe6PdZMRqi6mZUDOdWz7M/
story.html;  Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to 
Abuse, supra note 3. 
81 Maine Eye Care Associates P.A. v. Gorman, 2006 ME 15, ¶ 19, 890 A.2d 707, 711 (quoting 
Mariello v. Giguere, 667 A.2d 588, 590 (Me. 1995)). 
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hundred dollars’ worth of pecuniary damages is at stake (perhaps a few thousand if someone 
purchased a lobster dinner for a wedding party).  This is assuming that damages will be assessed 
at some multiple (one to three times) of the face value of the mislabeled fish and not at the 
difference in value between the fish listed on the menu and that actually served.  As such, it is 
simply not worth the time, effort, or legal bills, to pursue an individual claim for seafood 
substitution.  Thus any workable solution will require related claims to be aggregated or 
organized into larger, economically viable cases. 
 
III. ASSEMBLING A STATE BASED SOLUTION TO SEAFOOD SUBSTITUTION 
A. Defining Success 
The goal of this proposal is not to provide extensive damage awards to defrauded 
consumers, although that may be the short-term result.  Fundamentally, the objective is to reduce 
or eliminate retail and restaurant based seafood substitution without requiring state (in this case 
Maine) or federal agencies to substantially increase or reallocate enforcement resources.  The use 
of extensive damage provisions and/or fee shifting are merely tools that will be deployed to 
address a systemic problem.  To be clear, while it is hard to predict the actual numeric 
relationship between enforcement funding and the incidence of fraud, it is easy to infer from 
current experience that increased spending on enforcement would indeed lead to a reduction.82  
This self-imposed limit on additional government resources is not driven by any ideological 
dedication to smaller government, but rather by a “settled hopeless expectation”83 that our 
dysfunctional political environment makes any further direct allocation of regulatory and 
enforcement resources virtually impossible.  To that end, this comment makes the assumption 
that a workable proposal must find a way to promote detection of fraud by consumers, rather 
than by adding or redeploying highly trained law enforcement or code enforcement officials, and 
that enforcement/retributive actions must require the minimum viable use of government 
resources.  When government involvement is inevitable, it must attempt to provide for those 
resources through recovery, fines, and penalties.  
In addition to increasing the likelihood of exposure, a feasible proposal must provide an 
adequate economic deterrent to seafood substitution.  This impacts both the calculation of 
damages, which could be some multiple of the price paid for the mislabeled seafood or some 
nominal fee amount per incident, as well as addressing ways to organize cases into larger judicial 
units,84 such that recovery is large enough to support the legal action required.  The economic 
consequences could be further enhanced by shifting legal fees for a prevailing plaintiff.  
Finally, although invoking strict liability is likely a piece of the solution critical to 
streamlining the use of judicial resources, a workable proposal must differentiate bad faith actors 
engaged in active fraud from the hapless and easily duped.  There is a certain truth to the 
culinary proverb that the deep fat fryer is the great equalizer—after a piece of seafood is breaded 
                                                 
82 See Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Wagner, supra note 15; see also Daley & Abelson, 
Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.  
83 Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933) (quoting Willes, J. in Reg. v. Peel, 2 F. & F. 
21, 22). 
84 A hearty thank you to Prof. Petruccelli of the University of Maine School of Law for inserting 
this concept into the author’s lexicon during Civil Procedure II.  
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and fried it is indeed rather difficult to identify, even for trained professionals.85  Thus, there are 
probably some restaurants and retailers that have been confused or defrauded by their 
wholesalers and suppliers, and as such should be able to seek indemnity for any substitution 
liability from the ultimately responsible party.86  Furthermore, as this proposal is intended to 
reduce fraudulent behavior it must avoid creating a new mechanism for legal harassment and 
nuisance suits.  Thus some measure of fee shifting may also be employed to protect prevailing 
restaurants and retailers from plaintiffs caught acting in bad faith.87  
 
B. Modeling Effective Economic Deterrence 
Seafood substitution is primarily driven by a desire to enhance profitability, either 
through lower costs or higher prices.  If the fraudulent profitability can be wrung out, even 
statistically, the prevalence is likely to drop.  Therefore, in contemplating the scale of the 
damages and fees required to align the retail and restaurant industries against seafood 
substitution, it is useful to explore quasi-mathematical models similar to Justice Learned Hand’s 
famous B<PL balancing test for the burden of prevention in negligence cases.88  While this type 
of formula assumes that the actor considering mislabeling their fish is behaving rationally, a 
substantively and substantially debatable assumption, it provides a useful baseline from which to 
evaluate the economic considerations of this tortious behavior.  
Where Justice Hand’s formula was concerned with the burden of prevention (B), and the 
probability of an injury (P) if not prevented multiplied by the likely damages caused by the 
injury (L), the economic motivations of seafood substitutions is comprised of: excess/fraudulent 
profit generated by seafood substitution (denoted as πf); the probability of detection (D); and the 
penalty for detection (Pd).  In order to align against substitution, the penalty, multiplied by the 
likelihood of detection, must exceed the fraudulent profit generated (𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑).  Or stated in 
reverse, a rational fish fraudster will engage in seafood substitution so long as the profit exceeds 
the chance of detection times the penalty ( 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑).  Using this lens to analyze the current 
situation, where the likelihood of detection is anemic, and the possible legal89 and extra-legal90 
                                                 
85 See also This American Life: Doppelgängers, CHICAGO PUBLIC RADIO (Jan. 11, 2013), 
available at: https://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/484/doppelgangers?act=1 
(Act 1: investigating the veracity of an anecdotal report that pork bung (a.k.a. pork rectum) is 
sold as imitation calamari, and then examining the practicality of doing so through a side-by-side 
taste-test).  While somewhat disconcerting, this is one of the most entertaining media reports on 
the issue of seafood substitution.  Early in the episode is also a hilarious imitation of Ira Glass by 
Portlandia creator Fred Armisen.  
86 Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.  
87 E.g., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692k  (2016) (“On a finding by the 
court that an action under this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of 
harassment, the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the 
work expended and costs.”). 
88 See generally United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
89 A conviction for Deceptive Business Practices in Maine (Title 17-A, § 901) is a Class D crime 
carrying a maximum penalty of $2,000 or one year in county jail. Ignoring the possibility of jail 
time, imagine a scenario where the probability of detection is roughly 2%. Analyzed through the 
lens of 𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 and 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑, any profit of greater than $40 (.02 x $2,000 = $40) a month in 
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penalties are minimal to nonexistent, there is no effective economic deterrent.  Unsurprisingly, 
the market is rampant with mislabeled fish.  However, this exercise reveals that as the possibility 
of detection rises, the penalty can fall while still maintaining the incentive against fish fraud.  
Conversely, if the detection rate approaches zero, the formula makes clear that the nominal 
deterrent will need to increase towards infinity to be effective.  An impractical and daunting 
solution. Indeed, a workable proposal to address consumer facing seafood substitution should 
attempt to increase both the probability of detection and the resulting penalty in order to 
maximize deterrence.   
It is worth noting that the formula assumes away a great deal of complexity that could 
seriously impact the practicality of enforcement – including any probable correlation between 
variables, even those that could work to the advantage of any prevention scheme.  What we see 
from federal enforcement of mislabeled seafood under the Lacey Act is that the scale of the 
fraud, and thus the possible scale of the fines and penalties, anecdotally appears to have a 
positive correlation with the allocation of investigative resources.  Moreover, economic 
ramifications of setting the nominal penalty for detection, modified by the scope of time over 
which an individual case can consider infractions, will determine the viability of all of the 
possible mechanisms outlined below.  A penalty that is too low will fail to align incentives and 
thus fail to deter the behavior.  Conversely, a penalty that is too high could result in certain 
closure for retailers and restaurants that were merely negligent and not engaged in a systematic 
fraud.  The total value of the penalty will be determined by the scope of the actual or nominal 
damages to the consumer, as well as any imposition of a per claim or per incident (each piece of 
mislabeled fish) statutory penalty.  Possible penalty levels will be further discussed under each 
legal mechanism considered in the following section.  
 
C. Borrowing From Other Areas of Law 
1. Qui Tam Actions under the False Claims Act and Similar Statutes 
 One possible tool that could be brought to bear against the seafood substitution epidemic 
would be qui tam91 lawsuits in the model enabled by the Federal False Claims Act (“FFCA”).92  
                                                                                                                                                             
Maine would be statistically sustainable, and the fraudster would have no economic incentive to 
change behavior. For perspective, $40 is the potential excess profit generated by substituting 
frozen Pacific cod for fresh Atlantic cod in eight to twelve entrees.  That is less than six pounds 
of mislabeled cod (assuming very generous portions)—an amount that any seaside fish house 
could sell in the first few minutes of the lunch rush in July.  
90  Such as reputational damage, boycotts, customer switching, etc., which would increase the 
nominal value of Pd in supra note 89.  However, it should be noted that follow-up articles tend to 
reveal that even well documented mislabeling at restaurants is usually not corrected despite 
public shaming and extensive negative coverage (see Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open 
to Abuse, supra note 3; Abelson & Daley, On the Menu, supra note 3; Abelson & Daley, Many 
Mass. Restaurants Still Serve Mislabeled Fish, supra note 80).  This implies that the extra-legal 
costs to restaurants caught substituting seafood are relatively low. 
91 “‘Qui Tam,’ comes from the Latin phrase, ‘qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac 
parte sequitur,’ [which] translates into ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the King's behalf as 
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Under the FFCA (and many state equivalents) any person (individual or corporate entity) that 
submits certain types of fraudulent demands or claims for payment to the U.S. government is 
liable for $5,000 to $10,000 in civil penalties, plus triple any damages the government would 
have suffered because of the fraudulent demand.93  Actions under the FFCA can be brought by 
the U.S. Attorney General or by private parties, dubbed “relators,” that are an “original source” 
of the information regarding the false claim.94    
Roughly outlined, when a relator brings an action under the FFCA the complaint is filed 
in camera and remains under seal for at least 60 days to give the Government the opportunity to 
receive the complaint and all relevant evidence, and decide whether or not to elect to intervene.95  
Should the Government choose to intervene and proceed with a relator initiated action it shall 
assume “primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,” but does have discretion to dismiss 
the action, settle with the defendant, or engage in alternative remedies (such as other 
administrative procedures) with only limited review by the court for reasonableness and 
fairness.96  If the Government then prevails in the FFCA claim, the initiating relator shall receive 
fifteen to twenty-five percent of the recovered amount depending on their contribution to the 
prosecution of the claim.97  Should the Government elect not to pursue a relator’s claim, the 
relator shall have the right to bring the action themselves.98  If the relator then prevails, they shall 
receive twenty-five to thirty percent of the proceeds recovered on the Government’s behalf, as 
well as reasonable attorney’s fees, necessary expenses and costs.99   
 In order to follow a similar model, the enabling legislation would first have to establish a 
civil penalty for seafood substitution payable to the State, similar to the rules in Florida,100 or that 
proposed in Massachusetts.101  To properly discourage substitution, the total civil penalties 
related to an incident of fish fraud would need to be substantially higher than the $2,000 criminal 
penalty currently provided in Maine for those convicted under Deceptive Business Practices 
(Title 17-A, § 901), or the shellfish labeling provision (Title 12, § 6005).102  
                                                                                                                                                             
well as his own.’”  Joseph E. B. White, U.S. False Claims Act: Deputizing the Public to Combat 
Fraud, 38 FALSE CL. ACT AND QUI TAM Q. REV. 17 (July 2005). 
92 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-3733 (2016). 
93 31 U.S.C §3729(a)(1) (flush language); but see, 31 U.S.C. §3729(a)(2) (reduced damages of 
not less than double the amount sustained by the government can be awarded in situations where 
the liable party provides timely cooperation without knowledge of any investigation). 
94 “‘Original source’ means an individual who either (i)(sic) prior to a public disclosure under 
subsection (e)(4)(a), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which 
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) who has knowledge that is independent of 
and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily 
provided the information to the Government before filing an action under this section.”   
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
95 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
96 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c). 
97 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(1). 
98 31 U.S.C. §3730(c)(3). 
99 31 U.S.C. §3730(d)(2). 
100 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 509.292, § 775.082, and § 775.083. 
101 H.B. 4066, 189th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2016). 
102 See author’s analysis using 𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑and 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑 formulas, supra note 89. 
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In considering the total possible penalty (𝑃𝑑), there are a number of potential sub 
variables that will be determinative.  Since the State has not suffered any direct loss based on the 
true value of the seafood actually provided, or the nominal value of the seafood substituted, 
neither could rationally serve as a basis for the damages.  However, the options still include 
arbitrarily set penalties constructed as a single large nominal fine for being caught, say $5,000 to 
$10,000, or a smaller per incident (every plate of mislabeled fish proven to be served) that could 
quickly accumulate from a pattern of misbehavior.  For example, a $100 per incident penalty for 
a high-volume restaurant, serving 100 portions of mislabeled fish a week, would potentially add 
up to tens, or even hundreds, of thousands in fines depending on the time frame opened through 
discovery.103  While such a system could differentiate between incidental/infrequent negligence 
in labeling and systemic fraudulent behavior and business models, if the threat of exponential 
liability surpasses the potential value of the ongoing enterprise it will encourage business 
abandonment by rational bad actors.   
A more nuanced, but complex scheme of civil penalties, could match the mechanism to 
the type of malefactor.  For the first violation, or a violation below a certain scale (based on 
pounds of mislabeled fish or its nominal dollar value) could trigger a single civil penalty large 
enough to incentivize possible relators to instigate the suit, but ultimately not large enough to 
threaten the immediate economic viability of most restaurants or retailers.  A second or third 
violation, or violations over a certain metric of scale (number of incidents or perhaps number of 
pounds of fraudulent fish) could open the floodgates.  Certainly there is some level of 
systemically fraudulent behavior that is of a character so noxious that any just solution should 
warrant an existential threat to the survival of the enterprise (or chain/franchise location).  That 
said, multiple penalty tiers could unnecessarily complicate enforcement, and leave businesses 
with a lack of clarity about their potential liability.  
A possible flaw in a qui tam scheme to address seafood substitution is that it would 
depend on government involvement.  Presumably, the State Attorney General could be given the 
option, for each suit brought by a relator, to elect to assume control of the claim, or to decline to 
pursue it directly.  Currently, seafood substitution is not directly covered by any division of the 
Office of the Maine Attorney General, but could conceivably be included under the duties of the 
Consumer Protection Division.104  However, the statutory damages levied could self-fund the 
AG’s involvement in enforcement, assuming some measure of successful discretion in selecting 
targets.  Further, if the Government’s assumption of responsibility for the case is structured in 
the same way as the FFCA, the AG’s office would be able to step in with authority to settle cases 
that it felt were marginal.  The AG’s opportunistic intervention in the process would also provide 
some discretionary protection for restaurants, retailers, and wholesalers accused of fish fraud by 
bad faith actors or competitors.  Where the AG’s office feels that prosecution should be stayed in 
the interests of justice, it would have the power to do so.   
 
2. Class Action 
                                                 
103 A three month discoverable period based on a prima facie showing of fish fraud would open 
such a restaurant to roughly $130,000 in possible penalty liability under this scheme. 
104 See Office Organization, OFFICE OF THE MAINE ATTORNEY GENERAL,  
http://www.maine.gov/ag/about/office_organization.html (last visited Jan 17, 2017).  
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Given the systemic entrenchment of fish fraud in the U.S. food supply and consolidation 
in the restaurant industry, class action suits seem a ripe tool to organize common cases that seek 
to address seafood mislabeling and fraud claims.  Unfortunately, Maine has few directly on-point 
examples of class action suits used to address consumer fraud.  Regardless, it is clear that courts 
across other jurisdictions in the United States maintain a high bar for class certification, 
particularly in food labeling cases.105  Notwithstanding the critical eye of the courts, conceivable 
claims of seafood substitution and mislabeling against restaurants and retailers, resembling those 
reported in the press in recent years,106 could be pursued using Maine’s existing default class 
action rules, and the usefulness of class actions as a tool to address this specific issue could be 
enhanced through legislative findings in a supporting statute.  This would be an expansion of the 
type of findings and statements of purpose attached to many pieces of legislation, such as the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act,107 and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.108  
Me. R. Civ. P. 23(a) establishes the prerequisites for certification of a class action 
provided: 
 
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on 
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the 
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.109 
                                                 
105 See also Everest v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 2007 WL 4692839 (Me. Super. Ct. Jan 5, 2007) 
(denying class certification of UTPA claim for unjust enrichment for failure to meet ME. R. CIV. 
P. 23(b)(1), no danger posed by inconsistent adjudication, and 23(b)(3), lack of predominance or 
common questions of law and fact); Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2014 WL 2702726 (N.D. Cal. 
June 13, 2014) (class certification denied due for failure to meet Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), 
commonality/predominance of claims);  Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-CV-
02724-LHK, 2014 WL 7148923 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2014) (class decertified for failure to meet 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)); Astiana v. Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., 2014 WL 60097 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 7, 2014) (lack of ascertainable class of purchasers of disputed natural Dutch processed 
cocoa).  
106 See, e.g., Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3; Danna, supra note 3; Abelson & Daley, On the 
Menu, supra note 3; Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.  
107 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2015) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer 
reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer 
credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the 
consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization.”). 
108 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2015) (“It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt 
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using 
abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent 
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”). 
109 ME. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (2016).  
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While “[t]here is no threshold number of class members that automatically satisfies [the 
numerosity requirement]” of Rule 23(a)(1),110 it is arguably under the discretion of the court to 
consider the geographic distribution and identifiability of class members as well as the size of the 
damages claimed, in regard to the practicality of joinder, a relatively small number of actual 
plaintiffs would suffice. 111  Although a small number of plaintiffs may be legally sufficient, if 
damages sought are presumed at triple actual damages, the action may still not be economically 
viable regardless of the legal sufficiency.112  The barriers posed by Rule 23(a)(2), commonality 
of questions of law and fact, and Rule 23(a)(3), typicality of claims and defenses, could also be 
lowered through legislative findings that call out to the unifying characterization of seafood 
substitution.  This could include a statement to the effect that all of the consumer purchasers of 
allegedly mislabeled seafood within the statute of limitations from any specific retailer or 
restaurant have been injured by the same conduct, and thus share obviously common questions 
of law and fact subject to similarly typical claims and defenses.  
 Such a statement of legislative intent could also assist cases in meeting the certification 
prerequisites of Rule 23(a) to meet 23(b)’s requirements to maintain the class action.113  
                                                 
110 Van Meter v. Harvey, 272 F.R.D. 274, 280 (D. Me. 2011). 
111 See Richman, et al v. PCS, et al., No. BCD-WB-CV-10-53, at *3 (Me. Super. Ct. Jul . 12, 
2011) (order granting class certification).  
112 Assuming an exceedingly generous $100 per class member actual damages from seafood 
substitution, and that the class pursues a treble damages award, a seafood substitution class 
action seeking $50,000, excluding fees, would require 167 class members.  Which is certainly 
impractical for joinder.  However, a more conservative $25 per class member under an identical 
situation would require 667 class members to reach the same economic threshold, which, for the 
same nominal damages, may exponentially increase the cost of administering the class.  
113 ME. R. CIV. P. 23(b) provides: 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the 
class would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual 
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of 
conduct for the party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which 
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other 
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede 
their ability to protect their interests, or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or 
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the 
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that 
a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the 
prosecution or defense of separate actions; 
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Moreover, contemplating a case based around systemic mislabeling of local specialties, say 
substituting langoustine for Maine lobster, and envisioning the minimum required number of 
class members for economic viability, it is reasonable to argue that individual adjudication would 
be impractical (23(b)(1)(B)).  Similarly, one could argue that the common issues of fact and law 
lend credence to class action being the most “fair and efficient adjudication of the 
controversy.”114  
 One easily dismissed concern about using consumer class action suits as a primary 
enforcement tool is that when launched against out-of-state wholesalers or restaurant 
corporations (i.e. the owners of national restaurant chains), the cases would be subject to removal 
to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  While a motion to remove could 
be a possible tactic for delay, or an attempt to increase the cost of litigation, subjecting the case 
to the amount in controversy requirements would lead to remand.115  Further, obvious bad faith 
attempts at removal are subject to sanction or awards of fees.116  
 Of greater potential concern is that the average restaurant in Maine generates roughly 
$450,000 to $500,000 in annual revenue.117  Therefore, except for larger restaurants, chain 
establishments, or restaurants specifically focused on seafood, it is unlikely that restaurants in the 
lower fifty percent of the revenue distribution in Maine would have a large enough pool of 
defrauded patrons to make up a viable economic class action even if they were engaged in 
regular substitution.  Given that the goal is to root out systemic fraud at any scale, this limits the 
usefulness of class actions as a general purpose enforcement tool. 
Moreover, the economic incentive for third party action is diminished by the structural 
reality of class action remedies.  Assuming a contingent fee arrangement, only the law firm 
                                                                                                                                                             
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy 
already commenced by or against members of the class; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the 
claims in the particular forum; 
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class 
action. 
114 ME. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
115 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2016) ($75,000 exclusive of interest and costs); § 1332(d)(2) 
($5,000,000 for aggregate class action damages); Karofsky v. Abbott Labs., 921 F. Supp. 18, 20 
(D. Me. 1996) (remanded on plaintiff’s motion before class certification under ME. R. CIV. P. 23 
or FED. R. CIV. P. 23 for failure to meet $50,000 amount in controversy requirement under 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(a)), class cert. denied, 1997 WL 34504652, at *15 (Me. Super. Ct. Oct. 16, 1997) 
(failure to meet predominance/commonality and management requirements of ME. R. CIV. P. 
23(b)(3)). 
116 See, e.g., Peltier v. Peltier, 548 F.2d 1083, 1084 (1st Cir. 1977). 
117 Figure on average Maine restaurant revenue is extrapolated from: 2014 Maine Tourism 
Highlights, VISITMAINE.COM, available at 
http://visitmaine.com/assets/downloads/FactSheet2014.pdf (last visited Mar 3, 2016), and Matt 
Wolff, Restaurant Growth Index: The Best Places to Open a Restaurant, RESTAURANT BUSINESS 
(March 2011), available at 
http://www.nielsen.com/content/dam/corporate/us/en/public%20factsheets/restaurant-growth-
index.pdf.  
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representing the class has an economic incentive large enough to push the case forward, as there 
would be no direct participatory role for nonprofit consumer groups, and the award to any 
individual consumer would be de minimis.  To that end, even if enabled by legislative findings 
and statements of purpose, class actions for seafood substitution would still be rarely pursued. 
Therefore, while class action is a potential tool for recovery of individual damages, it remains 
less viable as a general purpose deterrent to fish fraud, and as such, will be excluded from further 
consideration in this proposal.  
 
3. Statutory Damages and Fee Shifting 
Rather than relying on actual damages, or some multiple of actual damages, seafood 
substitution claims could follow the example of Maine statutes setting minimum levels of 
damages or alternative damages calculation to actual damages (or multiple of actual damages) 
for specific claims in health care information protection,118 misbehavior by residential mortgage 
brokers,119 or the unlawful cutting of trees.120  Federal law similarly provides a range of statutory 
damages for copyright violations.121  
Statutory provisions that allow judicial discretion to award fees to the prevailing party, 
more commonly referred to as fee shifting, have been used extensively in Maine (and Federal) 
law as a method to strike a balance between the frivolity deterrence of the “British Rule,” and the 
rising economic costs that pose a barrier to small but meritorious claims under the “American 
Rule.”122  The most prominent federal example of awarding fees to the prevailing party is in civil 
rights litigation, but the same theory has been employed in a variety of less weighty contexts 
including the Hobby Protection Act.123  In Maine, fee shifting has been used to assist in 
                                                 
118 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-810(a) (2016) (“A health-care provider or institution that 
intentionally violates this Part is subject to liability to the aggrieved individual for damages of 
$500 or actual damages resulting from the violation, whichever is greater, plus reasonable 
attorney's fees.”). 
119 ME. REV. ANN. STAT. tit. 8-A, § 8-506(6) (2016) (“This subsection applies to any violation of 
this section in connection with the origination, brokering or servicing of a residential mortgage 
loan. . . (A) Any person who has been found in violation of this section . . . may be liable to the 
borrower for  . . . (4)(b) . . . statutory damages in the amount of $5,000 per violation.”). 
120 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2510(2) (2016) (“The following forfeitures may be adjudged 
for each tree over 2 inches in diameter that has been cut or felled: (A) if the tree is no more than 
6 inches in diameter, a forfeiture of $25 . . . (F) [i]f the tree is greater than 22 inches in diameter, 
a forfeiture of $150.”). 
121 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2016) (“The copyright owner may elect, at any time before final 
judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory 
damages for all infringements involved in the action . . . in a sum of not less than $750 or more 
than $30,000 as the court considers just.”). 
122 See Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The 
Promise of Reverse Cost-Shifting, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 317, 318 (2005) (Under the British Rule the 
losing party pays the legal cost for both parties, under the American Rule each party pays their 
own legal fees.).   
123 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2016) (“[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, 
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.”); 15 U.S.C. § 
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enforcement of healthcare claims, insurance fraud, illegal gambling, and litigation to enforce 
remediation of a bedbug infestation.124  In the case of seafood substitution the award of 
reasonable attorney’s fees serves both as an enabling mechanism to pay for meritorious but 
economically insufficient claims, but also serves to increase the penalty for fish fraud in a 
manner that encourages the defendant to settle smaller or indefensible claims.125  
Setting the level of statutory damage (including fees or not) is an exercise in game 
theory—minimizing the repetition of fraudulent seafood substitution by purveyors through the 
creation of an outsized deterrent.  As discussed in section III(B), Modeling Effective Economic 
Deterrence, the goal of this proposal is to wring out any likely profit from systemic fish fraud.  In 
doing so, the policy must consciously deal with the often conflicting secondary consideration of 
providing discretion to prevent abuse, while accelerating the learning curve for industry players 
and incentivizing action by consumer or third-party relators.  The weight of these factors must be 
considered under the specific implementation schedule for the statutory damages and strict 
liability provisions.  Again, analyzing possible penalties through the  𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 (or 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑) 
formula,126 a mechanical system of civil fines (including attorney’s fees) that increases the 
penalty in direct response to the scale of the fraud, seems to be the best approach towards 
balancing these factors, promoting third party enforcement, and punishing misbehavior.  Specific 
levels of penalties will be explored in Section IV. 
 
4. Strict Liability 
Strict liability, codified in statute, could help to minimize the use of court resources to 
adjudicate any specific incidence of fish fraud, and cut through the endemic finger pointing 
between suppliers and restaurants or retailers that act as barriers to establishing if purveyors 
knew, or should have known, that they were selling mislabeled fish.  Examples among Maine 
statutes include defective or unreasonably dangerous goods,127 and Maine’s “Dog Bite” 
                                                                                                                                                             
2102(a) (2016) (“[T]he court may award the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees.”). 
124 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-810 (2016) (Uniform Healthcare Decisions Act); ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2164-E (2016) (Maine Insurance Code); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 
1344 (2016) (Regulation of sales representation); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 300-A (2016) 
(Illegal bookmaking on harness racing); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.14, § 6021-A (2016) 
(Treatment of bedbug infestation). 
125 Under a fee shifting regime, 𝑃𝑑will increase rapidly, and in direct correlation, with the time 
spent litigating the case. Thus, for unambiguous cases of seafood substitution, a rational actor 
would seek to settle and limit the penalty.   
126 See author’s analysis/application of formula, supra note 88.  
127 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 221 (2016) (“One who sells any goods or products in a 
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject 
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to a person whom the manufacturer, seller or 
supplier might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods, or to his 
property, if the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product and it is expected to 
and does reach the user or consumer without significant change in the condition in which it is 
sold.”). 
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statute.128  Unlike these examples, however, there is no reasonable purpose for including the 
comparative fault of, or misuse by, the consumer as a defense to seafood substitution.  Instead, 
the statute must make explicit provisions to allow a defendant in a seafood substitution case to 
implead their suppliers as third party defendants.  In such situations the restaurant or retailer will 
need to offer some proof, likely through invoices or order documentation, that the impleader 
made good faith purchases of what they believed to be properly labeled fish and were defrauded 
themselves.  The goal of such procedure is to undermine the quiet collusion between wholesalers 
and retailers/restaurants with a healthy dose of foreseeable adversity and the potential for 
mistrust.  Moreover, if the Seafood Traceability Program survives the change in administrations 
and is implemented, the wholesaler would in turn be able to seek indemnification from the 
importer of record for any mislabeled imported fish, provided that species is covered under the 
program.  Regardless, a wholesaler is far less likely to enable a restaurant to serve mislabeled 
fish through doctored or misleading invoices if faced with a credible likelihood of discovery and 
potentially disastrous economic consequences.129   
 
5. Insurance as Quasi-Regulator of Ongoing Behavior 
As discussed above, systemic seafood substitution is enabled by the lack of enforcement 
and detection resources.  While the previous subsections of this comment have addressed ways 
to encourage non-governmental/outsourced detection and prosecution for fish fraud, the ongoing 
encouragement of compliance, a role frequently played by government employees (code 
enforcement, health inspectors, etc.), will also need to be outsourced.  This proposal seeks to 
create a deterrent to systemic fish fraud, by increasing both the probability of discovery and the 
penalty for misbehavior.  In essence, this proposal seeks to transfer some of the underlying risk 
of purchasing seafood as a consumer towards the commercial purveyors of seafood, creating new 
business risks that owners and entrepreneurs will need to address both financially and 
operationally.130   
Insurers are uniquely situated in the modern economy to address business risk, and to 
assist their clientele in mitigating those risks.131  Insurance, in and of itself, is a financial 
management tool that can, through a reasonable premium payment, prevent unavoidable or 
routine disasters from causing business failure.  In an effort to provide superior service and to 
reduce payout expenses, insurers have developed extensive operational expertise in loss 
prevention.132  Insurers also act as quasi-regulators through a variety of complimentary tools, 
including: (1) differentiating premiums, (2) refusal to insure/exclusions, (3) encouraging safer 
                                                 
128 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 3961(2) (2016) (“Notwithstanding subsection 1, when a dog 
injures a person who is not on the owner's or keeper's premises at the time of the injury, the 
owner or keeper of the dog is liable in a civil action to the person injured for the amount of the 
damages.  Any fault on the part of the person injured may not reduce the damages recovered for 
physical injury to that person unless the court determines that the fault of the person injured 
exceeded the fault of the dog's keeper or owner.”). 
129 See also, e.g., Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, supra note 3.  
130 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Kyle D. Logue, Outsourcing Regulation: How Insurance Reduces 
Moral Hazard, 111 MICH. L. REV. 197, 204 (2012). 
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 204-205.  
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conduct and implementing private safety codes, and (4) claims administration.133  In the context 
of seafood substitution these tools could help transform the enhanced risk of discovery and 
increased penalties into operational policies. 
First, differentiated premiums exist in part to prevent moral hazard and adverse selection 
on the part of businesses seeking insurance.  134  In a completely opaque insurance market, where 
the insurer has no information regarding the behavior of the insured, the price of insurance will 
gravitate towards the average possible damage.135  In such an imperfect market, adverse selection 
manifests through risky businesses purchasing higher coverage, seeing the price as a discount of 
their true risk; meanwhile careful businesses will drop coverage, as they see the cost of insurance 
as unreasonably high.136  Differentiated premium prices allow the insurer to utilize what they 
know about how a specific business operates – leading to the obvious proposition that purveyors 
that have been caught substituting seafood are obviously operating at a higher level of risk, have 
a higher probability of generating liability, and thus should pay higher premiums for insurance 
coverage.  
Second, general business liability insurance is a contractual relationship that cannot be 
forced upon the insurer.  Businesses that have engaged in systemic fish fraud as a business model 
may swiftly reach the point where the insurer does not believe they represent a viable risk at any 
premium level, leading to rescission for making a material misrepresentation, a refusal to renew, 
or a refusal to insure in the first place.137  Insurers can also insert exclusions into the policy for 
criminal activity and/or intentional violations of statutes.138  Thus, business models based on 
intentionally deceptive mislabeling will be excluded from insurance coverage, but a purveyor 
that makes a good faith mistake, is defrauded by its suppliers, or makes a negligent labeling 
error, will not be subject to fatal sanctions.   
Third, insurers develop tremendous expertise in business operations and risk mitigation 
and can promote best practices in day-to-day operations.  Both the refusal to insure and the use 
of differentiated premiums can be leveraged in this way, either by refusing to underwrite unless 
remedial procedures are implemented, or by offering a premium reduction for specific policy 
implementations.139  For seafood substitution, best practices would suggest that restaurants 
maintain a record of invoices documenting the chain of custody behind seafood purchases, and 
businesses that demonstrate during onsite audits that they meet record keeping requirements 
could be offered a discounted premium.  Alternatively, insurers may engage in ex-post 
underwriting by denying coverage of claims where the business failed to keep sufficient 
purchasing records.140  Further, such best practices could be codified into an industry safety 
doctrine.  
Finally, claims management and adjustment practices operate like a non-governmental 
judiciary, providing investigative resources and the ability to quantify damages before the 
                                                 
133 Id. at 204-215. 
134 See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113 
YALE L.J. 1223, 1223-24 (2004). 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 1224.  
137 Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 130, at 209. 
138 Id. at 215. 
139 Id. at 209-12. 
140 See id. at 215-16. 
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incident escalates to legal action.141  Given that damage awards are often restricted by the 
nominal amount of applicable liability coverage, claim management practices provide an 
efficient method of sorting quantifiable meritorious claims from the frivolous or nebulous, and 
quickly settling disputes in a uniform manner.142  For purveyors of seafood, having the insurer 
step in to manage the claims for substitution could reduce stress on operations, but also allow the 
insurer to rationally assess whether or not to settle, take the matter to trial, and/or implead 
suppliers to seek indemnification.  
 
D. Evidentiary Burden/Science of Fish Fraud Detection 
While the courts will need to develop a functional definition for a prima facie showing of 
seafood substitution, there are two obvious possibilities: (1) DNA sequencing, or (2) evidence of 
mismatched purchases and menu items, either through business records or employee testimony.  
A third possibility, specific to eating escolar, presents itself as well (i.e. documentation of 
extreme gastro-intestinal distress).  While DNA sequencing offers definitive proof as to what any 
given piece of fish actually is, the process is expensive and potentially time consuming.  
Moreover, it requires both specialized equipment and the development and use of protocol to 
address the sample’s chain of custody.  Detecting seafood substitution through invoice checking 
is much more practical, but it requires access to the records.  Invoice checking works well under 
legal regimes enforced by trained government agents, like in Florida or in investigations 
conducted by NOAA, but likely cannot be used to open the discovery door under this proposal. 
DNA bar coding has recently been rolled out by the FDA, but requires testing equipment 
costing upwards of $150,000.143  Once implemented, the FDA system costs as little as $10 per 
sample to test against a database of 250 common species.144  Several companies have developed 
technology that allows DNA testing in as little as forty five minutes to two hours,145 and has 
brought down the price for the equipment from hundreds of thousands of dollars to as little as 
two thousand for a single species test machine.146  This trend will likely continue, but until 
testing is cheap and easy enough to be conducted from a smartphone while eating out, the 
cumbersome reality of DNA testing will prevent widespread adoption by the general public. 
                                                 
141 Id. at 214-15.  
142 See Ben-Shahar & Logue, supra note 130, at 213-16; Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff, 
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability, 60 UCLA L. 
REV. 1412, 1421 (2013). 
143 Clare Leschin-Hoar, Specious Species: Fight against Seafood Fraud Enlists DNA Testing, 
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 10, 2011), https://perma.cc/3SUQ-EPHV. 
144 Id.  
145 Harness the power of real-time PCR to get fast and accurate DNA-based species 
identification, INSTANTLABS, available at: https://perma.cc/SM5N-M75L (last visited Jan. 9, 
2017).  Instantlabs offers testing for Blue Crab, Atlantic Salmon (farmed), Coho Salmon (wild), 
Chinook Salmon (wild), Sockeye Salmon (wild), and U.S. Catfish (coming soon), Horsemeat, 
Pork, and can develop custom testing for a target species.  
146 Robert Trigaux, USF scientists unveil device to unmask 'fake' grouper, TAMPA BAY TIMES, 
Feb. 3 2015, https://perma.cc/7L5T-BPGB; Christine Blank, Faster DNA testing could aid in 
seafood fraud, mislabeling in U.S. restaurants, SEAFOODSOURCE (Feb. 12, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/R4GP-R35B. 
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Consumer advocacy groups, local tourism associations, and health advocacy organizations, 
however, can sustain the economic cost of purchasing and operating the new lower priced 
equipment or, more likely, can undertake to pay the testing fee to third party laboratories. 
Further, provided a strong handling protocol is developed, coalitions of non-profits could operate 
national testing centers where consumers could send in preserved samples for testing.  
Currently, commercial testing services are available, and while pricing remains opaque, 
inquiries yielded DNA species identification tests at a range of $100 to $180 per test depending 
on volume.147  While an individual consumer, considering their own damages (the $5-10 they 
overpaid for their fish), would find the testing cost to be prohibitive, as part of a larger 
consolidated case, or a qui tam action alleging many instances of fish fraud, the cost of testing 
could be reduced to a rounding error.  
 
IV. RESTATEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL 
To reiterate from section III(A), the primary goal of this proposal is to substantially 
reduce or virtually eliminate intentional consumer facing seafood substitution.  To be successful 
the provisions must (1) enhance the penalties for selling fraudulently mislabeled fish and 
organize the cases into large enough judicial units such that recovery can support legal action; 
(2) increase the likelihood of discovery of the fraud with minimal or no additional government 
enforcement resources (such as field agents, investigators); (3) impose strict liability for selling 
mislabeled fish to minimize the additional burden on the judicial system; (4) provide enough 
flexibility to differentiate between good faith mistakes and bad faith systemic fraud, such as 
allowing retailers and restaurants to seek indemnification from suppliers if that is the source of 
the mislabeling; and (5) provide a mechanism to discourage or prevent harassment and nuisance 
suits against retailers and restaurants.  This section will discuss how the tools discussed above 
can be used to craft a legal framework to deter and punish seafood substitution while addressing 
the requirements based on the preceding analysis using Maine as an example.  
 
A. Assembling the Framework of the “Seafood Substitution Prevention and Fish Fraud 
Deterrence Act” 
 
1. Monetary Deterrent: Statutory Civil Penalties, Fee & Cost Shifting 
Assembling a post-regulatory regulatory framework to deter and punish seafood 
substitution is a recursive process, but a functional, if arbitrary, point to begin is with the scale 
and scope of possible penalties, and how to organize systemic fraud into particular sustainable 
cases.  As discussed in section II(c) and III(b) the current criminal penalties in Maine ($2,000) 
for fraudulent misrepresentation are woefully inadequate to the deterrence task, let alone to 
support litigation activity and incentivize detection.148  Given the limits of actual damages ($5-
$20 per pound of fish) in the case of any individual fraud, the solution appears to be a per 
                                                 
147 E-mail from LeAnn Applewhite, Applied Food Technologies, Inc., to Sage M. Friedman, 
Student, University of Maine School of Law (Mar. 22, 2016) (on file with author); e-mail from 
Joy Bolster, Account Services, Genetic ID, to Sage M. Friedman, Student, University of Maine 
School of Law (Mar. 21, 2016) (on file with author). 
148 See author’s analysis and application of formula, supra note 89. 
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incident statutory penalty.  Per incident is defined as each mislabeled seafood item sold: thus in a 
retail setting the sale of ten pounds of salmon mislabeled as wild, when in fact farm raised, 
would count as a single incident, as would the sale of one pound of mislabeled salmon; while in 
a restaurant setting each entrée or appetizer would count as an individual incident of fraudulent 
fish selling.  This penalty structure would mechanically increase the penalty for each bad act, 
appropriately scaling the fine to the scope of the malfeasance.  
While the statutory civil penalty is the largest component of the monetary deterrent (Pd), 
this proposal would also allow the court to stray from the traditional “American” model of legal 
fees, by awarding reimbursement of reasonable attorney’s fees, court fees, and testing 
expenditures, particularly the cost of DNA sequencing or DNA species matching, to a prevailing 
plaintiff.149  Thus, Pd is further increased in response to the size of the fraudulent activity and 
provides a monetary incentive for rational actors, such as liability insurers, to settle claims 
quickly and implement appropriate control systems to prevent future liability.  The potential for 
enhanced liability through automatically increasing fees could play an even more substantial role 
in settling follow-on suits and the impleading of third-party defendants, where the primary 
insurers to consumer-facing seafood sellers are seeking indemnification from negligent or 
fraudulent suppliers.  
In evaluating the mathematical outcome of this scheme, Pd is now defined as the statutory 
civil penalty ($150) per incident, plus reasonable attorney’s fees, court fees, and testing costs.150 
The scale of those penalties, however, is determined by the period of time over which the fraud 
is considered and over which a prima facie case of fish fraud would enable discovery. These 
matters will be discussed in more detail below.  
 
2. Incentivizing and Outsourcing Detection; Addressing Burden of Production 
Now that a penalty baseline has been established, the most obvious question is what 
portion of the penalty is available to consumers or NGOs to incentivize them to bring a case? 
Given the deficiency of class action suits, as discussed in III(C)(2), to provide an easily usable 
deterrent or avenue for NGOs or other third parties (including the government) to participate in 
enforcement, this proposal looks to the Federal False Claims Act (FFCA)151 and similar qui tam 
enforcement systems. Just as with the FFCA, cases could be brought on behalf of the State by 
private parties (consumers and NGOs), relators that are an “original source” for accusation of 
seafood substitution.152  Similar to the FFCA, the State of Maine’s Attorney General’s office 
would have some period of time, likely 30 or 60 days in which to receive all relevant evidence 
and decide whether or not to intervene in the case directly.153  Under this scheme, the relator (be 
they individual or NGO) would receive the lion’s share (fifty-five to seventy-five percent) of the 
civil penalties awarded if they were prosecuting the case directly, and a lesser rate when the 
                                                 
149 Subject to the procedure and process outlined in ME. R. CIV. P. 54.   
150 Pd = $150(#F) + Attorney’s Fees + Court Fees + Testing Costs, where #F is the number of 
incidents of fish fraud under consideration, and fees & costs are totaled for the case as a whole 
and subject to award under ME. R. CIV. P. 54 and the enabling statute.  
151 31 U.S.C §§ 3729-3733. 
152 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
153 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2). 
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government assumes control of the prosecution (twenty-five to thirty-five percent).154 
Additionally, to ensure that government supersession does not break the monetary incentives 
towards detection, attorney’s fees and associated costs could still be reimbursed up to some 
reasonable cost threshold considered adequate to make a prima facie showing (say $2,500 or 
$5,000).  Thus, even if the AG’s office then chooses to settle for a lower penalty, the relator who 
brings a credible claim would at least cover their costs, and not be left in the cold by government 
pragmatism.  
This again brings up the question of what would be required for a prima facie showing of 
fish fraud. There are two non-exhaustive but obvious answers: (1) DNA testing of samples of 
fish sold, and (2) documentary or testimonial proof of a mismatch between the label on fish sold 
and that on fish purchased. DNA evidence could be gathered directly by consumers, with 
samples taken from fish purchased at restaurants or retailers and sent to testing facilities in 
accordance with accepted evidentiary protocols, with expert reports being issued in response.155 
Testimonial evidence could consist of restaurant employees providing sworn statements averring 
to mislabeling based on personal knowledge of the packaging fish arrives in or the purchasing 
habits of the establishment.  Documentary evidence could include supplier invoices from the 
relevant time period that demonstrate the purchase of a different fish than that appearing to be 
sold.156  Any such showing should be enough to bring an initial case for review by the AG, and if 
the AG demurs to step in to prosecute directly, could open the doors for formal discovery and 
document production under the traditional standards of the court.  
Once discovery is enabled there are several possible ways to meet the required 
evidentiary burden to proceed past summary judgment: (1) the accused establishment’s inventory 
of seafood could be subject to random or comprehensive sampling and DNA testing, providing 
conclusive evidence that as of a certain date the fish in inventory was or was not what the 
establishment’s management claimed it was; or (2) the business records of the establishment 
would be subject to scrutiny including invoices, sales records, and menus.  An obvious 
disconnect between the fish bought and the fish sold would provide a strong inference that 
mislabeled fish was sold over the covered time frame.   
 
3. Strict Liability and Indemnification 
                                                 
154 Civil penalties as defined as the per incident penalty of $150 multiplied by the number of 
incidents included in the case. 
155 This comment leaves the questions of exactly how and why a court promulgates a specific 
functional definition of an acceptable evidence handling protocol for private parties to other 
capable authors at other more broadly-themed legal journals to discuss in detail. Instead, this 
comment assumes that such a protocol is either readily available “off the shelf” or easily 
adaptable to this purpose.  
156 To function properly this proposal will also require statutory authority to be vested in a 
comprehensive database of the legal and scientific names for commonly sold seafood.  
Notwithstanding the FDA’s protestations that its database does not have any such authority, FDA 
Seafood List, supra note 10, the simplest solution would be to adopt the Seafood List as the 
standard for labeling requirements; see Daley & Abelson, Fish Supply Chain Open to Abuse, 
supra note 3.  
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Again, it is worth reiterating that this proposal’s primary concern is not the punishment of 
wrongdoers, although that is a desirable outcome, but to deter ongoing systemic seafood 
substitution.  To that end, removing the issue of intent from consideration through strict statutory 
liability is expeditious in terms of minimizing the court resources required to adjudicate a case, 
and in allowing the conduct to fall under traditional business liability insurance unless explicitly 
excluded by the insurer.  As sophisticated managers of business risk, insurers will most certainly 
develop criteria for exclusion/inclusion of coverage for seafood substitution claims, including 
minimum record keeping requirements and claim management procedures that could develop 
into a private code of conduct, or de facto industry operating procedure.  Such quasi-regulatory 
activity is a highly desirable secondary goal of this proposal that will contribute to its overall 
effectiveness.157  
Under this strict liability scheme all that is required to implicate the defendant in the sale 
of mislabeled seafood would be clear and convincing evidence that mislabeled seafood was sold 
from the defendant’s establishment. Whether that sale was the product of intentional systemic 
fraud, or merely a negligent error, no longer requires inquiry, as in either case the purveyor has 
failed to meet their duty to the customer.  To avoid excessive punishments to those merely 
negligent (or easily duped) it is critically important that the seafood purveyor accused of 
fraudulent mislabeling be able to seek indemnification from suppliers that were either complicit 
in the fraud or the truly responsible party.  Existing court rules on third-party practice in Me. R. 
Civ. P. 14 should be sufficient to allow this, but it is still recommended that the enabling 
legislation should reiterate this intention to provide a clear signal to the courts of that 
expectation.  
 
4. Flexibility to Distinguish Between Good Faith Mistakes and Bad Faith Actors; Protection 
Against Abusive Litigation 
 
Indemnification, discussed above, provides one important mechanism for differentiating 
bad actors from those merely negligent.  The FFCA also provides a model for additional safe 
guards to prevent abuse, and provide the government and the courts the flexibility to tailor the 
solution to the needs of the case.  Under the model proposed, after receiving all relevant 
evidence, the Maine AG will have the opportunity to take over the prosecution of any case.  This 
will allow it both to assume command of particularly egregious cases where public policy 
dictates aggressive prosecution, but also allows the state to step in and settle marginal cases, 
setting a functional floor, under which prosecution is discouraged but corrective action is still 
taken.  
This capacity to intervene and settle also gives the State AG the ability to protect 
business owners from abusive litigation by extinguishing the suit before it proceeds to trial.  
Such protection could be further enhanced by adding explicit sanction language for non-
meritorious suits brought in bad faith and authorizing reverse fee shifting to the prevailing 
defendant in those extreme cases in line with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act158 that the 
court could utilize at its discretion.  Additional flexibility is provided in the structure of the 
                                                 
157 See Section III(C)(5), supra. 
158 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (2016) (“On a finding by the court that an action under this section was 
brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, the court may award to the defendant 
attorney's fees reasonable in relation to the work expended and costs.”). 
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penalties–as unintentional negligent mislabeling should be limited in scale or scope to a specific 
order of seafood from a supplier, a change to the menu, or some other distinct time period, 
limiting the number of incidents under consideration and thus the overall liability.  Systemic 
fraud, such that it is obviously part of the purveyor’s business plan, will not be so discretely 
contained temporally or monetarily, and should therefore open up the defendant to liability 
substantial enough that it poses a risk to the ongoing viability of the business.  
 
B. Phase in and Statute of Limitations 
This proposal is forward looking, and does not seek to redress wrongful conduct from 
before it goes into effect. To that end, the enabling legislation should have an effective date of no 
less than six months, but ideally closer to a year, from its date of passage.  No claims related to 
conduct taking place before the implementation of a comprehensive anti-seafood substitution 
framework would be considered, so as to allow the seafood industry and its insurers’ time to 
develop appropriate record keeping procedures and to adjust their operations accordingly before 
undertaking a new variety of potential liability.  Such a cleaning of the slate may be excessively 
generous to fraudulent purveyors, given the current statute of limitations on fraud in Maine of six 
years from discovery,159 but seems a practical way to avoid any assertions of due process 
violations in the first examples of litigation.  Additionally, it puts all restaurants and retailers on 
the same footing regarding their potential liability under the new scheme and provides businesses 
an opportunity to learn the lessons of the proposal before the penalty becomes an existential 
threat to their survival.  Regardless, once the anti-substitution framework has been implemented, 
a six-year-from-discovery statute of limitation would resume.  
 
V. ENFORCEMENT SCENARIOS 
To ground the proposal in reality, this comment now considers several probable, but 
admittedly speculative, enforcement scenarios that would be addressed within the first few years 
of any enforcement system based on this proposal, hypothetically dubbed the Seafood 
Substitution Prevention and Fish Fraud Deterrence Act (“The Act”).  These scenarios are not by 
any means exhaustive, but illustrate many of the considerations and potential pitfalls involved for 
the consumer, the relator, the defendant, the insurers, the AG’s office, and the court.  The 
primary differentiation between scenarios is the scale of the fraud and the intention of the 
purveyor.  All of these scenarios are considered at least several years after the passage of the Act, 
but all are envisioned as an early test of the new law.  Scenarios include: (A) systemic intentional 
mislabeling at a large scale tourist restaurant, (B) systemic mislabeling caused by a third party 
supplier, (C) negligent mislabeling, and (D) abusive/bad faith claims of mislabeling by an 
aggrieved former employee.  
 
A. Systemic Intentional Fraud at Scale 
                                                 
159 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 859 (2016).  
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In this scenario, a large restaurant with annual revenues in excess of five million 
dollars,160 called for convenience, the Tourist Trap (“the Trap”161), has engaged in systemic fraud 
for its entire operating history.  Particularly, the Trap offers for sale “Wild Salmon” that is 
actually farm-raised, “Native Maine Shrimp” that are actually farm-raised in Thailand, “local 
day-boat caught Atlantic Cod” that is actually frozen Pacific cod, and a variety of other white 
fishes on special, all of which are actually imported swai (Asian catfish) regardless of what the 
staff might call them.  The Trap operates as an LLC and is locally owned by a family, all of 
whom are involved directly in the Trap’s daily operations.  Located in a tourist-centric part of 
southern Maine, the Trap serves an average of 400 customers per day.  
The action is brought by the Maine Federation of Seafood Consumers (“MFCS”), a non-
profit group formed after the Act’s passage specifically to investigate and pursue claims of 
seafood substitution in Maine restaurants.  After receiving a tip from a former employee that the 
Trap was mislabeling its seafood, the MFSC had ten members dine at the restaurant and take 
samples, subject to appropriate handling procedures, that were sent for DNA testing.  The testing 
results clearly demonstrated mislabeling in all ten cases.  The testing costs roughly $1,000.  The 
MFSC then filed a qui tam complaint alleging ongoing seafood substitution in violation of the 
Act.  Despite the potential scale of the fraud, and the clear showing of preliminary evidence from 
the testing, the AG’s office decided not to intervene because this is the first large scale test of the 
Act.  
During discovery the lawyers for the MFSC successfully acquire both the purchasing 
records of the Trap, and that of its point of sale system, thus accessing a record of virtually every 
sale made over the previous three-year period and the corresponding invoices for fish from its 
suppliers. While the individual damages to any given consumer are minimal, only a few dollars 
per plate, the scale of the mislabeling is quite substantial in terms of customers defrauded–even if 
only five-percent of meals served featured one of the fraudulently mislabeled seafood items, that 
is still an average of 20 incidents of mislabeling per day of operation.  Thus over the course of a 
single year the Trap has served 7,280 mislabeled dishes, and under the Act, is liable for 
$1,092,000 in penalties. If they are caught after six years of post-Act conduct this egregious, the 
penalty liability mechanically rises to six million dollars, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and 
costs.  However, due to incomplete point-of-sale records and mismanaged purchasing records, at 
trial the record provides clear and convincing evidence of only 20,000 incidents of mislabeled 
fish.  The court calculates the penalty at the lowest level possible, awarding the State and MFSC 
$3,000,000 plus fees & costs (20,000 x $150 per incident).  
If the Trap has adequate liability insurance it will likely survive its first brush with the 
Seafood Substitution Prevention and Fish Fraud Deterrence Act, but even if it does its insurance 
premiums will skyrocket.  That is if any insurance company is willing to extend the Trap liability 
coverage in the future at any possible rate.  Regardless, in response to this litigation every 
insurance company in Maine will be adjusting its policies to reflect the potential risk from 
systemic seafood substitution and take steps to implement purchasing audits for policies where 
fish fraud liability could exceed one million dollars.  These quasi-regulatory actions would lead 
                                                 
160 For reference, average per unit (restaurant) sales for the Olive Garden was $4.5 million 
annually in 2015. DARDEN, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT: BACK TO BASICS, at 3 (2015), available at: 
https://s2.q4cdn.com/922937207/files/doc_financials/Darden-2015-Annual-Report-Final.pdf. 
161 “The Tourist Trap” is a completely fictional creation, and is not meant to represent any actual 
restaurant in Maine or elsewhere.  
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many other restaurants to clean up their act, and give insurance companies the leverage they need 
to insure good behavior or deny coverage to fish fraud claims.  The now very well-funded 
MFSC, which received fifty to seventy-five percent of the penalty for prosecuting the claim as 
well as having had its entire legal costs reimbursed, also has the Trap on its watch list and sends 
diners in frequently for follow-up testing.  
 
B. Supplier Shenanigans in Fine Dining 
In this scenario the MFSC brings a claim against a high-end seafood restaurant, called for 
convenience “Marla’s Oyster Shack.”162  Marla’s advertises itself heavily as a farm-to-table 
establishment that sources all of its meat, poultry, and fish from within 150 miles of its location 
in Portland, Maine.  Marla’s has annual revenues of about $500,000, serving roughly fifty 
customers on an average day.  Marla’s staple menu items are local Maine oysters, and Maine 
lobster rolls.  As it turns out, for the past few years Marla’s primary seafood supplier, Fake 
Fischer & Co, has been selling them farmed European oysters and shelled lobster meat from 
Connecticut, both falsely labeled as local Maine product.  Once again, the MFSC has members 
dine at Marla’s and sample the food for genetic testing, which provided a clear showing of 
mislabeling.  The MFSC files a complaint and awaits the AG’s office’s response.  In this case, 
the AG’s office decides to intervene and assumes control of the prosecution.   
The business records of invoices and the point of sale system uncovered during discovery 
clearly and convincingly reveal a pattern of systemic fraud, but in this case at the supplier level, 
implicating Fake Fischer.  Marla’s insurance company steps in to mount a defense, and impleads 
Fake Fischer & Co as a third-party defendant seeking indemnification on all counts, as well as 
reimbursement of legal fees.  The case is resolved by summary judgment, as Fake Fischer & Co. 
can offer nothing on the record to dispute the sale of mislabeled seafood by it to Marla’s and then 
to the general public.  Approximately fifty percent of Marla’s patrons ordered one of the 
mislabeled items, thus over its two years of operation approximately 2,600 fraudulent orders of 
fish were sold, with corresponding penalties totaling $390,000.  
Marla’s, while thoroughly inconvenienced by the lawsuit and having weathered a few 
cycles of bad press, emerges whole –recouping its legal fees from Fake Fischer’s insurance 
coverage.  The MFSC receives twenty-five percent of the penalty for its trouble and is 
reimbursed its minimal legal fees and testing costs.  It decides to spend that money investigating 
the labeling of fish at Fake Fischer & Co.’s other customer restaurants, and in many cases works 
directly with the defrauded restaurant owners to mount follow-on cases against their duplicitous 
supplier.  Fake Fischer’s insurance company refuses to renew their general liability policy, and 
while other coverage is available, it is prohibitively expensive.  Facing higher operating costs, 
ongoing liability from its history of fraudulent mislabeling, and the loss of its most profitable 
accounts, Fake Fischer & Co. ceases operation and files Chapter 7 bankruptcy for liquidation of 
its minimal assets.  Other similar suppliers take notice, and implement appropriate control 
systems to avoid a similar fate.  
 
C. Negligent Mislabeling – A.K.A. the Chowder Fish Problem 
                                                 
162 “Marla’s Oyster Shack” is a completely fictional creation, and is not meant to represent any 
actual restaurant in Maine or elsewhere.  
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Bob the Fishmonger163 (“Bob’s”) offers a variety of fresh and frozen seafood from Maine 
and away in one of Maine’s darling Mid-Coast cities.  Among its many offerings is an 
assortment of fish scraps for $5.99 a pound.  Labeled as “Chowder Fish,” the mix could contain 
an assortment of ground fish including cod, haddock, hake, pollack, grouper, flounder, tilapia, 
red (or other) snapper, and at least half a dozen other species.  When asked about it, the 
employees working the counter at Bob’s always say that it is mostly cod and haddock.  However, 
because the “chowder fish” is made up of scraps and undersized pieces of other fish, Bob has no 
records available to offer proof.  Further, operating mostly on cash, Bob’s record keeping for the 
sale of “chowder fish” is essentially non-existent.  Mary, a summertime resident of the 
neighborhood and semi-retired attorney, incensed by the low quality of the “chowder fish” her 
spouse brought home to make into cioppino,164 sent a sample in for testing that revealed the 
scraps to be mostly inexpensive farm-raised tilapia.  Mary decides to file a complaint under the 
Act, alleging the sale of mislabeled fish.  
The AG’s office decides to intervene and settle the case.  While Bob’s conduct is clearly 
a violation of the Act, the documentary record, even after discovery, is thin and the actual 
damages to Mary and other patrons are arguable at best.165  As part of the settlement Bob agrees 
to reimburse Mary’s legal fees, which are covered by Bob’s insurance policy.  Bob also enters 
into a consent agreement with the AG’s office requiring it to label its “Chowder Fish” more 
clearly.  Patrons to Bob the Fishmonger can now buy “Assorted fish pieces for chowder or 
stew*” at $5.99 a pound.  Bob, under pressure from his insurer, has upgraded his record keeping 
procedures and point of sale system to avoid similar problems in the future.  
 
D. Abusive Litigation 
James was a waiter at the Green Lobster in South Portland, Maine.  The Green Lobster is 
part of a national seafood restaurant chain known for its low-cost lobster dinners.166  James was 
fired for taking excessively long breaks and writing in false tip amounts on customer checks.  
After he was fired, James files a series of complaints alleging sale of mislabeled seafood at all of 
the Green Lobster’s five locations throughout Maine.  James attests that the Green Lobster’s 
Maine Lobster Tail Dinner actually features spiny lobster (a.k.a. rock lobster or langostas) tails 
harvested in Florida.  James has no actual proof of these claims, neither genetic testing nor 
business records, but in pursuit of a perceived windfall he has filed nonetheless.  James’ lawyer 
should have investigated the claim enough to believe it was filed in good faith, as required under 
Me. R. Civ. P. 11, but that is not what happened, and these frivolous complaints reach the court.  
                                                 
163 Bob the Fishmonger is a fictional creation. 
164 Italian Seafood Stew. See, e.g., Giada De Laurentiis, Cioppino, THE FOOD NETWORK, 
http://www.foodnetwork.com/recipes/giada-de-laurentiis/cioppino-recipe.html (last visited April 
15, 2016).  
165 In the author’s opinion $5.99 a pound for tilapia is a reasonably good price as of January 
2017.  
* This assortment is offered as a special and may or may not include Cod, Haddock, Hake, 
Tilapia, Pollock, Flounder, Grouper, Snapper, and an assortment of other fish depending on 
availability each day.  
166 “The Green Lobster” is obviously modeled on a well-known American chain-restaurant but is 
fictional, and is not meant to imply any misbehavior by its real-world inspiration.  
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The case proceeds to discovery, only to be revealed as lacking all merit.  The court disposes of 
the allegations via summary judgment, sanctioning James’ lawyer and James himself jointly by 
awarding Green Lobster a reimbursement of reasonable attorney’s fees and discovery costs.  
James, being an out of work waiter who was fired for cause, is unable to pay the judgment.  
More importantly, lawyers hearing similar complaints from disgruntled former employees in the 
future learn to apply a more rigorous investigation to accusations of fish fraud before bringing 
suit under the Act.  
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Rampant, systemic, intentional seafood substitution is a threat to public health, to the 
environment, to conservation of endangered species, to the economy of communities dependent 
on the bounty of the ocean, and to the integrity of the U.S. food supply chain.  It is a problem so 
large, so massive in scale, that it costs consumers in the United States alone as much as twenty-
five billion dollars each year.167  Yet, seafood substitution is a problem that the Federal 
government provides less than a hundred trained agents to fight.168  In response to this terminal, 
intractable disconnect between the scale of the problem and the resources marshalled to address 
it, this comment has proposed a radical solution to shift the economics of the industry against 
mislabeling.  
As the narratives of possible enforcement scenarios above demonstrate, this scheme 
could lead to penalties of a magnitude that cast doubt on the survival of fraudulent purveyors.  
Indeed, such a solution may seem outsized when measured against the circumstances of any 
individual example of mislabeling, but it is a draconian solution tailored to a systemic problem 
that existing laws and regulation have been unable to curtail.  The goal is deterrence of obviously 
fraudulent conduct by the purveyors of seafood, who have strayed outside of legal and ethical 
behavior because of the profit motive, and whose bad behavior has been enabled by lax 
enforcement.  This is a radical solution offered because there seems to be no hope that the simple 
solutions, such as hiring more trained regulators and inspectors, the interim solutions, such as the 
SAFE Seafood Act, or the comprehensive solutions, such as implementing and funding all the 
recommendations of the Presidential Task Force on Combating IUU Fishing and Seafood Fraud, 
can be enacted in the dysfunctional environment of modern American politics.  
In an ideal world this proposal, if implemented, would be enforced no more than handful 
of times – the idea being that by bringing the full might of the penalty down on a few of the most 
egregiously bad actors, likely ending their businesses, the rest of the industry will take notice and 
rationally change their behavior to reflect the new economics of fish fraud.  If business operators 
fail to notice and change their behavior, the insurance industry will step in to protect its own 
interests by requiring proof of better behavior in order to maintain liability coverage.  That said, 
for all the fearsome scale of the potential penalties, this proposal offers a state-based solution, 
crafted from tested legal tools, which should limit any concern about unforeseen consequences 
and market disruption.  
In closing, please note that this proposal is not offered as a comprehensive or best-
practices solution, but as a counterpoint to the inaction of the status quo.  It is an effort to stop 
floundering around on seafood substitution and finally align the interests of consumers, retailers 
                                                 
167 Lou, Bait and Switch, supra note 3. 
168 Rentz, supra note 6.  
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and restaurants against the regulatory and marketing failures that continue to allow widespread 
mislabeling and outright fraud.  By borrowing the qui tam structure and checks of the Federal 
False Claims Act, fee shifting from civil rights law, and harnessing the quasi-regulatory power of 
the market for business liability insurance, this proposal crafts a deterrent large enough to shift 
monetary incentives; to realign the structure of the consumer facing seafood industry against 
substitution through the use of a scalable, flexible deterrent and incentives to promote third-party 
detection.  These measures would not only increase the independent probability of detection and 
the monetary penalty for being caught, but also link the two variables in a virtuous cycle where 
higher penalties attract more scrutiny, which in turn results in more severe consequences for bad 
behavior.  This approach would drive the level of illicit profits required to support systemic fraud 
to increasingly unsustainable heights, and by wringing out the fraudulent profits accomplish the 
goal of reducing consumer facing seafood substitution. 169   
 
                                                 
169 As D and Pd rise, 𝜋f must also rise or a rational fraudster would discontinue mislabeling 
because the risk of the consequences would exceed the expected value of the profits. Further, 
under this proposal Pd increases with every fraudulent act, making the only way to cap liability to 
cease the behavior. See 𝜋𝑓 < 𝐷𝑃𝑑 and 𝜋𝑓 > 𝐷𝑃𝑑 analysis and application, supra note 89. 
